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This chapter discusses identiﬁcation of common selection models of the labor market.
We start with the classic Roy model and show how it can be identiﬁed with exclusion
restrictions. We then extend the argument to the generalized Roy model, treatment
eﬀect models, duration models, search models, and dynamic discrete choice models.
In all cases, key ingredients for identiﬁcation are exclusion restrictions and support
conditions.
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This chapter discusses identiﬁcation of common selection models of the labor market.
We are primarily concerned with nonparametric identiﬁcation. We view nonparametric
identiﬁcation as important for the following reasons.
First, recent advances in computer power, more widespread use of large data sets,
and better methods mean that estimation of increasingly ﬂexible functional forms is
possible. Flexible functional forms should be encouraged. The functional form and
distributional assumptions used in much applied work rarely come from the theory.
Instead, they come from convenience. Furthermore, they are often not innocuous.1
Second, the process of thinking about nonparametric identiﬁcation is useful input
into applied work. It is helpful to an applied researcher both in informing her about
which type of data would be ideal and which aspects of the model she might have
some hope of estimating. If a feature of the model is not nonparametrically identiﬁed,
then one knows it cannot be identiﬁed directly from the data. Some additional type
of functional form assumption must be made. As a result, readers of empirical papers
are often skeptical of the results in cases in which the model is not nonparametrically
identiﬁed.
Third, identiﬁcation is an important part of a proof of consistency of a nonpara-
metric estimator.
However, we acknowledge the following limitation of focusing on nonparametric
identiﬁcation. With any ﬁnite data set, an empirical researcher can almost never be
completely nonparametric. Some aspects of the data that might be formally identiﬁed
could never be estimated with any reasonable level of precision. Instead, estimators
are usually only nonparametric in the sense that one allows the ﬂexibility of the model
to grow with the sample size. A nice example of this is Sieve estimators in which
one estimates ﬁnite parameter models but the number of parameters gets large with
the data set. An example would be approximating a function by a polynomial and
letting the degree of the polynomial get large as the sample size increases. However,
in that case one still must verify that the model is nonparametrically identiﬁed in
1A classic reference on this is Lalonde (1986) who shows that parametric models cannot replicate
the results of an experiment. Below we present an example on Catholic Schools from Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005a) suggesting that parametric assumptions drive the empirical estimates.
1order to show that the model is consistent. One must also construct standard errors
appropriately. In this chapter we do not consider the purely statistical aspects of
nonparametric estimation such as calculation of standard errors. This is a very large
topic within econometrics.2
The key issue in identiﬁcation of most models of the labor market is the selection
problem. For example, individuals are typically not randomly assigned to jobs. With
this general goal in mind we begin with the simplest and most fundamental selection
model in labor economics, the Roy (1951) model. We go into some detail to explain
Heckman and Honor´ e’s (1990) results on identiﬁcation of this model. A nice aspect
of identiﬁcation of the Roy model is that the basic methodology used in this case can
be extended to show identiﬁcation of other labor models. We spend the rest of the
chapter showing how this basic intuition can be used in a wide variety of labor market
models. Speciﬁcally we cover identiﬁcation in the generalized Roy model, treatment
eﬀect models, the competing risk model, search models, and forward looking dynamic
models. While we are clearly not covering all models in labor economics, we hope the
ideas are presented in a way that the similarities in the basic models can be seen and
can be extended by the reader to alternative frameworks.
The plan of this chapter is speciﬁcally as follows. Section 2 discusses some econo-
metric preliminaries. We consider the Roy model in section 3, generalize this to the
Generalized Roy model in section 4, and then use the model to think about identi-
ﬁcation of treatment eﬀects in section 5. In section 6 we consider duration models
and search models and then consider estimation of dynamic discrete choice models in
section 7. Finally in section 8 we oﬀer some concluding thoughts.
2 Econometric Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Throughout this chapter we use capital letters with i subscripts to denote random
variables and small letters without i subscripts to denote possible outcomes of that
random variable. We will also try to be explicit throughout this chapter in denoting
2See Chen (2007) for discussion of Sieve estimators, including standard error calculation.
2conditioning. Thus, for example, we will use the notation
E(Yi | Xi = x)
to denote the expected value of outcome Yi conditional on the regressor variable Xi
being equal to some realization x.
2.2 Identiﬁcation
The word “identiﬁcation” has come to mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent labor economists.
Here, we use a formal econometrics deﬁnition of identiﬁcation. Consider two diﬀerent
models that lead to data generating processes. If the data generated by these two
models have exactly the same distribution then the two models are not separately
identiﬁed from each other. However, if any two diﬀerent model speciﬁcations lead to
diﬀerent data distributions, the two speciﬁcations are separately identiﬁed. We give
a more precise deﬁnition below. Our deﬁnition of identiﬁcation is based on some of
the notation and set up of Matzkin’s (2007) following an exposition based on Shaikh
(2010).
Let P denote the true distribution of the observed data X. An econometric model
deﬁnes a data generating process. We assume that the model is speciﬁed up to an
unknown vector θ of parameters, functions and distribution functions. This is known
to lie in space Θ. Within the class of models, the element θ ∈ Θ determines the
distribution of the data that is observable to the researcher Pθ. Notice that identiﬁcation
is fundamentally data dependent. With a richer data set, the distribution Pθ would be
a diﬀerent object.
Let P be the set of all possible distributions that could be generated by the class
of models we consider (i.e. P ≡ {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}). We assume that the model is correctly
speciﬁed which means that P ∈ P. The identiﬁed set is deﬁned as
Θ(P) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ : Pθ = P}.
This is the set of possible θ that could have generated data that has distribution P.
By assuming that P ∈ P we have assumed that our model is correctly speciﬁed so this
set is not empty. We say that θ is identiﬁed if Θ(P) is a singleton for all P ∈ P.
The question we seek to answer here is under what conditions is it possible to
learn about θ (or some feature of θ) from the distribution of the observed data P.
3Our interest is not always to identify the full data generating process. Often we are
interested in only a subset of the model, or a particular outcome from it. Speciﬁcally,
our goal may be to identify
ψ = Ψ(θ)
where Ψ is a known function. For example in a regression model Yi = X′
iβ + ui, the
feature of interest is typically the regression coeﬃcients. In this case Ψ would take the
trivial form
Ψ(θ) = β.
However, this notation allows for more general cases in which we might be interested in
identifying speciﬁc aspects of the model. For example, if our interest is in identifying
the covariance between X and Y in the case of the linear regression model, we do not
need to know θ per se, but rather a transformation of these parameters. That is we
could be interested in
Ψ(θ) = Cov(Xi,Yi).
We could also be interested in a forecast of the model such as
Ψ(θ) = x
′β
for some speciﬁc x. The distinction between identiﬁcation of features of the model as
opposed to the full model is important as in many cases the full model is not identiﬁed,
but the key feature of interest is identiﬁed.
To think about identiﬁcation of ψ we deﬁne
Ψ(Θ(P)) = {Ψ(θ) : θ ∈ Θ(P)}.
That is, it is the set of possible values of ψ that are consistent with the data distribution
P. We say that ψ is identiﬁed if Ψ(Θ(P)) is a singleton.
As an example consider the standard regression model with two regressors:
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + εi (2.1)
with E(εi | Xi = x) = 0 for any value x (where Xi = (X1i,X2i)). In this case
θ = (β,FX,ε) where FX,ε is the joint distribution of (X1i,X2i,εi) and β = (β0,β1,β2).
One would write Θ as B × FX,ε where B is the parameter space for β and FX,ε is the
4space of joint distributions between Xi and εi that satisfy E(εi | Xi = x) = 0 for all x.
Since the data here is represented by (X1i,X2i,Yi), Pθ represents the joint distribution
of (X1i,X2i,Yi). Given knowledge of β and FX,ε we know the data generating process
and thus we know Pθ.
To focus ideas suppose we are interested in identifying β (i.e. Ψ(β,FX,ε) = β) in
regression model (2.1) above. Let the true value of the data generating process be θ∗ =
(β∗,F ∗
X,ε) so that by deﬁnition Pθ∗ = P. In this case Θ(P) ≡
 
(β,FX,ε) ∈ B × FX,ε : Pβ,Fx,ε = P
 
,
that is it is the set of (β,FX,ε) that would lead our data (Xi,Yi) to have distribu-
tion P. In this case Ψ(Θ(P)) is the set of values of β in this set (i.e. Ψ(Θ(P)) =
{β : (β,FX,ε) ∈ Θ(P) for some FX,ε ∈ FX,ε}).
In the case of 2 covariates, we know the model is identiﬁed as long as X1i and X2i
are not degenerate and not collinear. To see how this deﬁnition of identiﬁcation applies
to this model, note that for any β∗  = β the lack of perfect multicollinearity means that
we can always ﬁnd values of (x1,x2) for which







Since E(Yi | Xi = x) is one aspect of the joint distribution of Pθ, it must be the case
that when β∗  = β, Pθ  = P. Since this is true for any value of β  = β∗, then Ψ(Θ(P))
must be the singleton β∗.
However, consider the well known case of perfect multicollinearity in which the
model is not identiﬁed. In particular suppose that
X1i + X2i = 1.
For the true value of β∗ = (β∗
0,β∗
1,β∗





2,0). Then for any x,























=   β0 +   β1x1.
If FX,ε is the same for the two models, then the joint distribution of (Yi,Xi) is the
same in the two cases. Thus the identiﬁcation condition above is violated because with
5  θ = (  β,F ∗
X,ε), P  θ = P and thus   β ∈ Ψ(Θ(P)). Since the true value β∗ ∈ Ψ(Θ(P)) as
well, Ψ(Θ(P)) is not a singleton and thus β is not identiﬁed.
2.3 Support
Another important issue is the support of the data. The simplest deﬁnition of support
is just the range of the data. When data are discrete, this is the set of values that occur
with positive probability. Thus a binary variable that is either zero or one would have
support {0,1}. The result of a die roll has support {1,2,3,4,5,6}. With continuous
variables things get somewhat more complicated. One can think of the support of a
random variable as the set of values for which the density is positive. For example, the
support of a normal random variable would be the full real line (which we will often
refer to as “full support”). The support of a uniform variable on [0,1] is [0,1]. The
support of an exponential variable would be the positive real line.
This can be somewhat trickier in dealing with outcomes that occur with mea-
sure zero. For example one could think of the support of a uniform variable as
[0,1],(0,1],[0,1), or (0,1). The distinction between these objects will not be impor-
tant in what we are doing, but to be formal we will use the Davidson (1994) deﬁnition
of support. He deﬁnes the support of a random variable with distribution F as the
set of points at which F is (strictly) increasing.3 By this deﬁnition, the support of a
uniform would be [0,1]. We will also use the notation supp(Yi) to denote the uncondi-
tional support of random variable Yi and supp(Yi | Xi = x) to denote the conditional
support.
To see the importance of this concept, consider a simple case of the separable
regression model
Yi = g(Xi) + ui
with a single continuous Xi variable and E(ui | Xi = x) = 0 for x ∈ supp(Xi). In this
case we know that
E(Yi | Xi = x) = g(x).
Letting X be the support of Xi, it is straightforward to see that g is identiﬁed on the set
X. But g is not identiﬁed outside the set X because the data is completely silent about
these values. Thus if X = R, g is globally identiﬁed. However, if X only covers a subset
3He deﬁnes F (strictly) increasing at point x to mean that for any ε > 0, F(x + ε) > F(x − ε).
6of the real line it is not. For example, one interesting counterfactual is the change in the
expected value of Yi if Xi were increased by δ : E(g(Xi +δ)). If X = R this is trivially
identiﬁed, but if the support of Xi were bounded from above, this would no longer be
the case. That is, if the supremum of X is ¯ x < ∞, then for any value of x > ¯ x − δ,
g(x+δ) is not identiﬁed and thus the unconditional expected value of g(Xi +δ) is not
identiﬁed either. This is just a restatement of the well known fact that one cannot
project out of the data unless one makes functional form assumptions. Our point here
is that support assumptions are very important in nonparametric identiﬁcation results.
One can only identify g over the range of plausible values of Xi if Xi has full support.
For this reason, we will often make strong support condition assumptions. This also
helps illuminate the tradeoﬀ between functional form assumptions and ﬂexibility. In
order to project oﬀ the support of the data in a simple regression model one needs to
use some functional form assumption. The same is true for selection models.
2.4 Continuity
There is one complication that we need to deal with throughout. It is not a terribly
important issue, but will shape some of our assumptions. Consider again the separable
regression model
Yi = g(Xi) + ui. (2.2)
As mentioned above E(Yi | Xi = x) = g(x) so it seems trivial to see that g is identiﬁed,
but that is not quite true. To see the problem, suppose that both Xi and ui are






0 x < 1.4







0 x ≤ 1.4
1 x > 1.4
.
These models only diﬀer at the point x = 1.4, but since Xi is normal this is a zero
probability event and we could never distinguish between these models because they
7imply the same joint distribution of (Xi,Yi). For the exact same reason it isn’t really a
concern (except in very special cases such as if one was evaluating a policy in which we
would set Xi = 1.4 for everyone). Since this will be an issue throughout this chapter
we explain how to deal with it now and use this convention throughout the chapter.
We will make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.1. Xi can be written as (Xc
i,Xd
i ) where the elements of Xc
i are con-
tinuously distributed (no point has positive mass), and Xd
i is distributed discretely (all
support points have positive mass).
Assumption 2.2. For any xd ∈ supp(Xd




The ﬁrst part says that we can partition our observables into continuous and discrete
ones. One could easily allow for variables that are partially continuous and partially
discrete, but this would just make our results more tedious to exposit. The second
assumption states that choosing a value of X at which g is discontinuous (in the
continuous variables) is a zero probability event.
Theorem 2.1. Under assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and assuming model 2.2 with E(ui |
Xi = x) = 0 for x ∈ supp(Xi), g(x) is identiﬁed on a set X ∗ that has measure 1.
(Proof in Appendix)
The proof just states that g is identiﬁed almost everywhere. More speciﬁcally it is
identiﬁed everywhere that it is continuous.
3 The Roy Model
The classic model of selection in the labor market is the Roy (1951) model. In the
Roy model, workers choose one of two possible occupations: hunting and ﬁshing. They
cannot pursue both at the same time. The worker’s log wage is Yfi if he ﬁshes and
Yhi if he hunts. Workers maximize income so they choose the occupation with higher





f if Yfi > Yhi
h if Yhi ≥ Yfi
(3.1)
8and the log wage is deﬁned as
Yi = max{Yfi,Yhi}. (3.2)
Workers face a simple binary choice: choose the job with the highest wage. This
simplicity has led the model to be used in one form or another in a number of important
labor market contexts. Many discrete choice models share the Roy model’s structure.
Examples in labor economics include the choice of whether to continue schooling, what
school to attend, what occupation to pursue, whether to join a union, whether to
migrate, whether to work, whether to obtain training, and whether to marry.
As mentioned in the introduction, we devote considerable attention to identiﬁcation
of this model. In subsequent sections we generalize these results to other models.
The responsiveness of the supply of ﬁshermen to changes in the price of ﬁsh depends
critically on the joint distribution of (Yfi,Yhi). Thus we need to know what a ﬁsherman
would have made if he had chosen to hunt. However, we do not observe this but must
infer its counterfactual distribution from the data at hand. Our focus is on this selection
problem. Speciﬁcally, much of this chapter is concerned with the following question:
Under what conditions is the joint distribution of (Yfi,Yhi) identiﬁed? We
start by considering estimation in a parametric model and then consider nonparametric
identiﬁcation.
Roy (1951) is concerned with how occupational choice aﬀects the aggregate distri-
bution of earnings and makes a series of claims about this relationship. These claims
turn out to be true when the distribution of skills in the two occupations is lognormal.
Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) consider identiﬁcation of the Roy model (i.e., the joint
distribution of (Yfi,Yhi)). They show that there are two methods for identifying the
Roy model. The ﬁrst is through distributional assumptions. The second is through
exclusion restrictions.4
In order to focus ideas, we use the following case:
Yfi = gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi (3.3)
Yhi = gh(Xhi,X0i) + εhi, (3.4)
4Heckman and Honor´ e discuss price variation as separate from exclusion restrictions. However, in
our framework price changes can be modeled as just one type of exclusion restriction so we do not
explicitly discuss price variation.
9where the unobservable error terms (εfi,εhi) are independent of the observable variables
Xi = (Xfi,Xhi,X0i) and Yfi and Yhi denote log wages in the ﬁshing and hunting
sectors respectively. We distinguish between three types of variables. X0i inﬂuences
productivity in both ﬁshing and hunting, Xfi inﬂuences ﬁshing only, and Xhi inﬂuences
hunting only. The variables Xfi and Xhi are “exclusion restrictions,” and play a very
important role in the identiﬁcation results below. In the context of the Roy model, an
exclusion restriction could be a change in the price of rabbits which increases income
from hunting, but not from ﬁshing. The notation is general enough to incorporate a
model without exclusion restrictions (in which case one or more of the Xji would be
empty).
Our version of the Roy framework imposes two strong assumptions. First, that Yji is
separable in gj(Xji,X0i) and εji for j ∈ {f,h}. Second, we assume that gj(Xji,X0i) and
εji are independent of one another. Note that independence implies homoskedasticity:
the variance of εji cannot depend on Xji. There is a large literature looking at various
other more ﬂexible speciﬁcations and this is discussed thoroughly in Matzkin (2007).
It is also trivial to extend this model to allow for a general relationship between X0i
and (εfi,εhi) as we discuss in section 3.3 below.
We focus on the separable independent model for two reasons. First, the assump-
tions of separability and independence have bite beyond a completely general non-
parametric relationship. That is, to the extent that they are true, identiﬁcation is
facilitated by these assumptions. Presumably because researchers think these assump-
tions are approximately true, virtually all empirical research uses these assumptions.
Second, despite these strong assumptions, they are obviously much weaker than the
standard assumptions that g is linear (i.e. gf(Xfi,X0i) = X′
fiγff + X′
0iγ0f and that
εfi is normally distributed. One approach to writing this chapter would have been to
go through all of the many speciﬁcations and alternative assumptions. We choose to
focus on a single base speciﬁcation for expositional simplicity.
Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) ﬁrst discuss identiﬁcation of the joint distribution of
(Yfi,Yhi) using distributional assumptions. They show that when one can observe the
distribution of wages in both sectors, and assuming (Yfi,Yhi) is joint normally dis-
tributed, then the joint distribution of (Yfi,Yhi) is identiﬁed from a single cross section
even without any exclusion restrictions or regressors. To see why, write equations (3.3)
10and (3.4) without regressors (so gf =  f, the mean of Yfi):
Yfi =  f + εfi



























(with φ and Φ the pdf and cdf of a standard normal),
c =





and for each j ∈ {h,f},
τj =
σ2





One can derive the following conditions from properties of normal random variables
found in Heckman and Honor´ e (1990):
Pr(Ji = f) = Φ(c)
E(Yi | Ji = f) =  f + τfλ(c)
E(Yi | Ji = h) =  h + τhλ(−c)




















[Yi − E(Yi | Ji = f)]













[Yi − E(Yi | Ji = h)]











This gives us seven equations in the ﬁve unknowns  f, h,σ2
f,σ2
h, and σfh. It is straight-
forward to show that the ﬁve parameters can be identiﬁed from this system of equations.
11However, Theorems 7 and 8 of Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) show that when one
relaxes the log normality assumption, without exclusion restrictions in the outcome
equation, the model is no longer identiﬁed. This is true despite the strong assumption
of agent income maximization. This result is not particularly surprising in the sense
that our goal is to estimate a full joint distribution of a two dimensional object (Yfi,Yhi),
but all we can observe is two one dimensional distributions (wages conditional on job
choice). Since there is no information in the data about the wage that a ﬁsherman may
have received as a hunter, one cannot identify this joint distribution. In fact, Theorem
7 of Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) states that we can never distinguish the actual model
from an alternative model in which skills are independent of each other.
3.1 Estimation of the Normal Linear Labor Supply model
It is often the case that we only observe wages in one sector. For example, when
estimating models of participation in the labor force, the wage is observed only if
the individual works. We can map this into our model by associating working with
“ﬁshing” and not working with “hunting.” That is, we let Yfi denote income if working
and let Yhi denote the value of not working.5
But there are other examples in which we observe the wage in only one sector. For
example, in many data sets we do not observe wages of workers in the black market
sector. Another example is return immigration in which we know when a worker leaves
the data to return to their home country, but we do not observe that wage.
In Section 3.2 we discuss identiﬁcation of the nonparametric version of the model.
However, it turns out that identiﬁcation of the more complicated model is quite similar
to estimation of the model with normally distributed errors. Thus we review this in
detail before discussing the nonparametric model. We also remark that providing a
consistent estimator also provides a constructive proof of identiﬁcation, so one can also
interpret these results as (informally) showing identiﬁcation in the normal model. The
5There are two common participation models. The ﬁrst is the home production model in which
the individual chooses between home and market production. The second is the labor supply model
in which the individual chooses between market production and leisure. In practice the two types
of models tend to be similar and some might argue the distinction is semantic. In a model of home
production, Yhi is the (unobserved) gain from home production. In a model of labor supply, Yhi is
the leisure value of not working.
12model is similar to Willis and Rosen’s (1979) Roy Model of educational choices or Lee’s
































In a labor supply model where f represents market work, Yfi is the market wage which
will be observed for workers only. Yhi, the pecuniary value of not working, is never
observed in the data. Keane, Todd, and Wolpin’s (this volume) example of the static
model of a married woman’s labor force participation is similar.
One could simply estimate this model by maximum likelihood. However we discuss
a more traditional four step method to illustrate how the parametric model is identi-
ﬁed. This four step process will be analogous to the more complicated nonparametric
identiﬁcation below. Step 1 is a “reduced form probit” of occupational choices as a
function of all covariates in the model. Step 2 estimates the wage equations by con-
trolling for selection as in the second step of a Heckman Two step (Heckman, 1979).
Step 3 uses the coeﬃcients of the wage equations and plugs these back into a probit
equation to estimate a “structural probit.” Step 4 shows identiﬁcation of the remaining
elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.
Step 1: Estimation of Choice Model
The probability of choosing ﬁshing (i.e., work) is:















































13This is referred to as the “reduced form model” as it is a reduced form in the classical
sense: the parameters are a known function of the underlying structural parameters.
It can be estimated by maximum likelihood as a probit model. Let   γ∗ represent the
estimated parameter vector. This is all that can be learned from the choice data alone.
We need further information to identify σ∗ and to separate γ0f from γ0h.
Step 2: Estimating the Wage Equation





























The wage of those who choose to work is
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Showing that E (ε∗
i | ε∗
i ≤ x′γ∗) = −λ(x′γ∗) is a fairly straightforward integration prob-
lem and is well known. Because equation (3.6) is a conditional expectation function,
OLS regression of Yi on X0i, Xfi, and λ
 
X′
i   γ∗ 
gives consistent estimates of γff,γ0f,
and τ.   γ∗ is the value of γ∗ estimated in equation (3.5).
Note that we do not require an exclusion restriction. Since λ is a nonlinear function,
but gf is linear, this model is identiﬁed. However, without an exclusion restriction,
identiﬁcation is purely through functional form. When we consider a nonparametric
14version of the model below, exclusion restrictions are necessary. We discuss this issue
in section 3.2.
Step 3: The Structural Probit










and in Step 2 we obtained consistent estimates of γ0f and
γff.
When there is only one exclusion restriction (i.e. γff is a scalar), identiﬁcation
proceeds as follows. Because we identiﬁed γff in Step 2 and γff/σ∗ in Step 1, we can
identify σ∗. Once σ∗ is identiﬁed, it is easy to see how to identify γhh (because
−γhh
σ∗ is
identiﬁed) and γ0h (because
γ0f−γ0h
σ∗ and γ0f are identiﬁed).
In terms of estimation of these objects, if there is more than one exclusion restriction
the model is over-identiﬁed. If we have two exclusion restrictions, γff and γff/σ∗ are
both 2 × 1 vectors, and thus we wind up with 2 consistent estimates of σ∗. The most
standard way of solving this model is by estimating the “structural probit:”
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That is, one just runs a probit of Ji on
 
X′
fi   γff + X′
0i   γ0f
 
, X0i, and Xhi where   γff and
  γ0f are our our estimates of γff and γ0f.
Step 3 is essential if our goal is to estimate the labor supply equation. If we are
only interested in controlling for selection to obtain consistent estimates of the wage
equation, we do not need to worry about the structural probit. However, notice that







and thus the labor supply elasticity is:
∂log[Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x)]
∂Yfi
=
∂Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x)
∂Yfi
1







where, as before, Yfi is the log of income if working. Thus knowledge of σ∗ is essential
for identifying the eﬀects of wages on participation.
One could not estimate the structural probit without the exclusion restriction Xfi
as the ﬁrst two components of the probit in equation (3.7) would be perfectly collinear.
For any σ∗ > 0 we could ﬁnd a value of γ0h and γhh to that delivers the same choice
probabilities. Furthermore, if these parameters were not identiﬁed, the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to wages would not be identiﬁed either.
15Step 4: Estimation of the Variance Matrix of the Residuals
Lastly, we identify all the components of Σ, (σ2
f,σ2
h,σfh) as follows. We have described








gives us two equations in three parameters. We can obtain the ﬁnal equation by using
the variance of the residual in the selection model since













Let i = 1,..,Nf index the set of individuals who choose Ji = f and   εfi is the residual
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3.2 Identiﬁcation of the Roy Model: the Non-Parametric Ap-
proach
Although the parametric case with exclusion restrictions is more commonly known, the
model in the previous section is still identiﬁed non-parametrically if the researcher is
willing to impose stronger support conditions on the observable variables. Heckman
and Honor´ e (1990, Theorem 12) provide conditions under which one can identify the
model nonparametrically using exclusion restrictions. We present this case below.
Assumption 3.1. (εfi,εhi) is continuously distributed with distribution function G,
support R2, and is independent of Xi. The marginal distributions of εfi and εfi − εhi
have medians equal to zero.
Assumption 3.2. supp(gf(Xfi,x0),gh(Xhi,x0)) = R2 for all x0 ∈ supp(X0i).
Assumption 3.2 is crucial for identiﬁcation. It states that for any value of gh(xh,x0),
gf(Xfi,x0) varies across the full real line and for any value of gf(xf,x0), gh(Xhi,x0)
varies across the full real line. This means that we can condition on a set of variables
for which the probability of being a hunter (i.e. Pr(Ji = h|Xi = x)) is arbitrarily close
to 1. This is clearly a very strong assumption that we will discuss further.
We need the following two assumptions for the reasons discussed in section 2.4.







where the elements of (Xc
fi,Xc
hi,Xc
0i) are continuously distributed (no point has posi-
tive mass), and (Xd
fi,Xd
hi,Xd
0i) is distributed discretely (all support points have positive
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0) are almost surely continuous across xc ∈ supp(Xc
i | Xd
i = xd).
Under these assumptions we can prove the theorem following Heckman and Honor´ e(1990).
Theorem 3.1. If (Ji ∈ {f,h}, Yfi if Ji = f, Xi) are all observed and generated under
model (3.1)-(3.4), then under assumptions 3.1-3.4, gf, gh, and G are identiﬁed on a
set X ∗ that has measure 1.
(Proof in Appendix)
A key theme of this chapter is that the basic structure of identiﬁcation in this model
is similar to identiﬁcation of more general selection models so we explain this result in
much detail. The basic structure of the proof we present below is similar to Heckman
and Honor´ e’s proof of their Theorems 10 and 12. We modify the proof to allow for the
case where Yhi is not observed.
The proof in the appendix is more precise, but in the text we present the basic ideas.
We follow a structure analogous to the parametric empirical approach when the residu-
als are normally distributed as presented in section 3.1. First we consider identiﬁcation
of the occupational choice given only observable covariates and the choice model. This
is the nonparametric analogue of the reduced form probit. Second we estimate gf given
the data on Yfi which is the analogue of the second stage of the Heckman two step, and
is more broadly the nonparametric version of the classical selection model. In the third
step we consider the nonparametric analogue of identiﬁcation of the structural probit.
Since we will have already established identiﬁcation of gf, identiﬁcation of this part
of the model boils down to identiﬁcation of gh. Finally in the fourth step we consider
identiﬁcation of G (the joint distribution of (εfi,εhi)). We discuss each of these steps
in order.
To map the Roy model into our formal deﬁnition of identiﬁcation presented in sec-
tion 2.2, the model is determined by θ = (gf,gh,G,Fx) where Fx is the joint distribution
of (Xfi,Xhi,X0i). The observable data here is (Xfi,Xhi,X0i,Ji,1(Ji = f)Yfi). Thus P
17is the joint distribution of this observable data and Θ(P) represents the possible data
generating processes consistent with P.
Step 1: Identiﬁcation of Choice Model
The nonparametric identiﬁcation of this model is established in Matzkin (1992). We
can write the model as
Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = Pr(εhi − εfi < gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0))
= Gh−f(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0)),
where Gh−f is the distribution function of εhi − εfi.
Using data only on choices, this model is only identiﬁed up to a monotonic trans-
formation. To see why, note that we can write Ji = f when
gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0) > εhi − εfi (3.8)
but this is equivalent to the condition
M(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0)) > M(εhi − εfi) (3.9)
where M(.) is any strictly increasing function. Clearly the model in equation (3.8) can-
not be distinguished from an alternative model in equation (3.9). This is the nonpara-
metric analog of the problem that the scale (i.e., the variance of εhi −εfi) and location
(only the diﬀerence between gf(xf,x0) and gh(xh,x0) but not the level of either) of the
parametric binary choice model are not identiﬁed. Without loss of generality we can
normalize the model up to a monotonic transformation. There are many ways to do
this. A very convenient normalization is to choose the transformation M( ) = Gh−f( )
because Gh−f (εhi − εfi) has a uniform distribution.6 So we deﬁne
εi ≡ Gh−f(εhi − εfi)
g(x) ≡ Gh−f(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0)).











Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = Pr(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0) > εhi − εfi)
= Pr(Gh−f(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0)) > Gh−f(εhi − εfi))
= Pr(εi < g(x))
= g(x).
Thus we have established that we can (i) write the model as Ji = f if and only if
g(Xi) > εi where εi is uniform [0,1] and (ii) that g is identiﬁed.
This argument can be mapped into our formal deﬁnition of identiﬁcation from
Section 2.2 above. The goal here is identiﬁcation of g so we deﬁneΨ(θ) = g. Note
that even though g is not part of θ, it is a known function of the components of θ.
The key set now is Ψ(Θ(P)) which is now deﬁned as the set of possible values g that
could have generated the joint distribution of (Xfi,Xhi,X0i,Ji,1(Ji = f)Yfi). Since
Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = g(x), no other possible value of g could generate the data. Thus
Ψ(Θ(P)) only contains the true value and is thus a singleton.
Step 2: Identiﬁcation of the Wage Equation gf
Next consider identiﬁcation of gf. Median regression identiﬁes
Med(Yi | Xi = x,Ji = f) = gf(xf,x0) + Med(εfi | Xi = x,εi < g(x)).
The goal is to identify gf(xf,x0). The problem is that when we vary (xf,x0) we
also typically vary Med(εfi | Xi = x,g(x) > εi). This is the standard selection
problem. Because we can add any constant to gf and subtract it from εfi without
changing the model, a normalization that allows us to pin down the location of gf is
that Med(εfi) = 0. The problem is that this is the unconditional median rather than
the conditional one. The solution here is what is often referred to as identiﬁcation at
inﬁnity (e.g. Chamberlain, 1986, or Heckman, 1990). For some value (xf,x0) suppose
we can ﬁnd a value of xh to send Pr(εi < g(x)) arbitrarily close to one. It is referred to
as identiﬁcation at inﬁnity because if gh were linear in the exclusion restriction xh this
could be achieved by sending xh → −∞. In our ﬁshing/hunting example, this could
be sending the price of rabbits to zero which in turn sends log income from hunting to
19−∞. Then notice that7
lim
g(x)→1
Med(Yi | Xi = x,Ji = f) = gf(xf,x0) + lim
g(x)→1
Med(εfi | εi ≤ g(x)) = gf(xf,x0) + Med(εfi | εi ≤ 1)
= gf(xf,x0) + Med(εfi)
= gf(xf,x0).
Thus gf is identiﬁed.
Conditioning on x so that Pr(Ji = 1 | Xi = x) is arbitrarily close to one is essentially
conditioning on a group of individuals for whom there is no selection, and thus there
is no selection problem. Thus we are essentially saying that if we can condition on a
group of people for whom there is no selection we can solve the selection bias problem.
While this may seem like cheating, without strong functional form assumptions
it is necessary for identiﬁcation. To see why, suppose there is some upper bound of
supp[g(Xi)] equal to gu < 1 which would prevent us from using this type of argument.
Consider any potential worker with a value of εi > gu. For those individuals it must be
the case that
εi > g(Xi)
so they must always be a hunter. As a result, the data is completely uninformative
about the distribution of εfi for these individuals. For this reason the unconditional
median of εfi would not be identiﬁed. We will discuss approaches to dealing with this
potential problem in the Treatment Eﬀect section below.
To relate this to the framework from Section 2.2 above now we deﬁne Ψ(θ) = gf,
so Ψ(Θ(P)) contains the values of gf consistent with P. However since
lim
g(x)→∞
Med(Yf | Xi = x,Ji = f) = gf(xf,x0),
gf is the only element of Ψ(Θ(P)), thus it is identiﬁed.
Identiﬁcation of the Slope Only without “Identiﬁcation at Inﬁnity”
If one is only interested in identifying the “slope” of gf and not the intercept, one
can avoid using an identiﬁcation at inﬁnity argument. That is, for any two points
(xf,x0) and (˜ xf, ˜ x0), consider identifying the diﬀerence gf (xf,x0) − gf (˜ xf, ˜ x0). The
7We are using loose notation here. What we mean by limg(x)→1 is to hold (xf,x0) ﬁxed, but take
a sequence of values of xh so that g(x) → 1.
20key to identiﬁcation is the existence of the exclusion restriction Xhi. For these two
points, suppose we can ﬁnd values xh and ˜ xh so that
g(xf,xh,x0) = g(˜ xf, ˜ xh, ˜ x0).
There may be many pairs of (xh, ˜ xh) that satisfy this equality and we could choose any
of them. Deﬁne ˜ x ≡ (˜ xf, ˜ xh, ˜ x0). The key aspect of this is that since g(x) = g(˜ x), and
thus the probability of being a ﬁsherman is the same given the two sets of points, then
the bias terms are also the same:Med(εfi | εi < g(x)) = Med(εfi | εi < g(˜ x)).
This allows us to write
Med(Yi | Xi = x,Ji = f) − Med(Yi | Xi = ˜ x,Ji = f)
=gf (xf,x0) + Med(εfi | εi < g(x))
− [gf (˜ xf, ˜ x0) + Med(εfi | εi < g(˜ x))]
=gf (xf,x0) − gf (˜ xf, ˜ x0).
As long as we have suﬃcient variation in Xhi we can do this everywhere and identify
gf up to location.
Step 3: Identiﬁcation of gh
In terms of identifying gh, the exclusion restriction that inﬂuences wages as a ﬁsherman
but not as a hunter (i.e. Xfi) will be crucial. Consider identifying gh(xh,x0) for any
particular value (xh,x0). The key here is ﬁnding a value of xf so that
Pr(Ji = f | Xi = (xf,xh,x0)) = 0.5. (3.10)
Assumption 3.2 guarantees that we can do this. To see why equation (3.10) is useful,
note that it must be that for this value of (xf,xh,x0)
0.5 = Pr(εhi − εfi ≤ gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0)). (3.11)
But the fact that εhi − εfi has median zero implies that
gh(xh,x0) = gf(xf,x0).
21Since gf is identiﬁed, gh is identiﬁed from this expression.8
Again to relate this to the framework in Section 2.2 above, now Ψ(θ) = gh and
Ψ(Θ(p)) is the set of functions gh that are consistent with P. Above we showed that if
Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = 0.5, then gh(xh,x0) = gf(xf,x0). Thus since we already showed
that gf is identiﬁed, gh is the only element of Ψ(Θ(p)).
Step 4: Identiﬁcation of G
Next consider identiﬁcation of G given gf and gh. We will show how to identify the
joint distribution of (εfi,εhi) closely following the exposition of Heckman and Taber
(2008). Note that from the data one can observe
Pr(Ji = f,Yfi < s | Xi = x)
= Pr(gh(xh,x0) + εhi ≤ gf(xf,x0) + εfi,gf(xf,x0) + εfi ≤ s) (3.12)
= Pr(εhi − εfi ≤ gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0),εfi ≤ s − gf(xf,x0))
which is the cumulative distribution function of (εhi − εfi,εfi) evaluated at the point
(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0),s − gf(xf,x0)). By varying the point of evaluation one can
identify the joint distribution of (εhi − εfi,εfi) from which one can derive the joint
distribution of (εfi,εhi).
Finally in terms of the identiﬁcation conditions in Section 2.2 above, now Ψ(θ) = G
and Ψ(Θ(P)) is the set of distributions G consistent with P. Since G is uniquely deﬁned
by the expression (3.12) and since everything else in this expression is identiﬁed, G is
the only element of Ψ(Θ(P)).
3.3 Relaxing Independence between Observables and Unob-
servables.
For expositional purposes we focus on the case in which the observables are independent
of the unobservables, but relaxing these assumptions is easy to do. The simplest case
is to allow for a general relationship between X0i and (εfi,εhi). To see how easy this
8Note that Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) choose a diﬀerent normalization. Rather than normalizing
the median of εhi − εfi to zero (which is convenient in the case in which Yhi is not observed) they
normalize the median of εhi to zero (which is more convenient in their case). Since this is just a
normalization, it is innocuous. After identifying the model under our normalization we could go back
to redeﬁne the model in terms of theirs.
22is, consider a case in which X0i is just binary, for example denoting men and women.
Independence seems like a very strong assumption in this case. For example, the
distribution of unobserved preferences might be diﬀerent for women and men, leading
to diﬀerent selection patterns. In order to allow for this, we could identify and estimate
the Roy model separately for men and for women. Expanding from binary X0i to ﬁnite
support X0i is trivial, and going beyond that to continuous X0i is straightforward.
Thus one can relax the independence assumption easily. But for expositional purposes
we prefer our speciﬁcation.
The distinction between Xfi and X0i was not important in steps 1 and 2 of our dis-
cussion above. When one is only interested in the outcome equation Yfi = gf(Xfi,X0i)+
εfi, relaxing the independence assumption between Xfi and (εfi,εhi) can be done as
well. However, in step 3 this distinction is important in identifying gh and the inde-
pendence assumption is not easy to relax.
If we allow for general dependence between X0i and (εfi,εhi), the “identiﬁcation at
inﬁnity” argument becomes more important as the argument about “Identiﬁcation of
the Slope Only without Identiﬁcation at Inﬁnity” no longer goes through. In that case
the crucial feature of the model was that Med(εfi | εi < g(x)) = Med(εfi | εi < g(˜ x)).
However, without independence this is no longer generally true because Med(εfi | Xi =
x,Ji = f) = Med(εfi | X0i = x0,εi < g(x)). Thus even if g(x) = g(˜ x), when x0  = ˜ x0,
in general Med(εfi | X0i = x0,εi < g(x))  = Med(εfi | X0i = ˜ x0,εi < g(˜ x)).
3.4 The Importance of Exclusion Restrictions
We now show that the model is not identiﬁed in general without an exclusion restric-





f if g(Xi) − εi ≥ 0
h otherwise
Yfi = gf(Xi) + εfi
9An exception is Buera (2006), who allows for general functional forms and does not need an
exclusion restriction. Assuming wages are observed in both sectors, and making stronger use of the
independence assumption between the observables and the unobservables, he shows that the model
can be identiﬁed without exclusion restrictions.
23where εi is uniform (0,1) and (εi,εfi) is independent of Xi with distribution G and we
use the location normalization Med(εfi | Xi) = 0. As in Section 3.2, we observe Xi,
whether Ji = f or h, and if Ji = f then we observe Yfi.
We can think about estimating the model from the median regression
Med[Yfi|Xi = x] =gf(Xi) + Med[εfi|Xi = x]
=gf(Xi) + Med[εfi|g(Xi) > εi]
=gf(Xi) + h(g(Xi)) (3.13)
Under the assumption that Med(εfi | Xi) = 0 it must be the case that h(1) = 0, but
this is our only restriction on h and g. Thus the model above has the same conditional
median as an alternative model
Med[Yfi|Xi = x] =  gf(Xi) +   h(g(Xi)) (3.14)
where   gf(Xi) = gf(Xi) + k(g(Xi)) and   h(g(Xi)) = h(g(Xi)) − k(g(Xi)). Equations
(3.13) and (3.14) are observationally equivalent. Without an exclusion restriction, it
is impossible to tell if observed income from working varies with Xi because it varies
with gf or because it varies with the labor force participation rate and thus the extent
of selection. Thus the models in equations (3.13) and (3.14) are not distinguishable
using conditional medians.
To show the two models are indistinguishable using using the full joint distribution
of the data, consider an alternative data generating model with the same ﬁrst stage,
but now Yfi is determined by
Yfi =   gf(Xi) +   εfi
where   εfi is independent of Xi with Med(  εfi | Xi) = 0. Let   G(εi,  εfi) be the joint
distribution of (εi,  εfi) in the alternative model. We will continue to assume that
in the alternative model   gf(Xi) = gf(Xi) + k(g(Xi)). The question is whether the
alternative model to be able to generate the same data distribution.
In the true model
Pr(εi ≤ g(x),Yfi < y) = Pr(εi ≤ g(x),gf(x) + εfi ≤ y)
= G(g(x),y − gf(x))
24In the alternative model
Pr(εi ≤ g(x),Yfi < y) = Pr(εi ≤ g(x),  gf(x) +   εfi ≤ y)
=   G(g(x),y −   gf(x))
Thus these two models generate exactly the same joint distribution of data and cannot
be separately identiﬁed as long as we deﬁne   G so that10
  G(g(x),y −   gf(x)) = G(g(x),y − gf(x))
= G(g(x),y −   gf(x) + k(g(x))).
4 The Generalized Roy Model
We next consider the “Generalized Roy Model” (as deﬁned in e.g. Heckman and Vyt-
lacil, 2007a). The basic Roy model assumes that workers only care about their income.
The Generalized Roy Model allows workers to care about non-pecuniary aspects of the
job as well. Let Ufi and Uhi be the utility that individual i would receive from being
a ﬁsherman or a hunter respectively where for j ∈ {f,h},
Uji = Yji + ϕj(Zi,X0i) + νji. (4.1)
where ϕj(Zi,X0i) represents the non-pecuniary utility gain from observables Zi and X0i.
The variable Zi allows for the fact that there may be other variables that aﬀect the taste
for hunting versus ﬁshing directly, but do not aﬀect wages in either sector.11 Note that
we are imposing separability between Yji and ϕj. In general we can provide conditions
in which the results presented here will go through if we relax this assumption but we





f if Ufi > Uhi
h if Ufi ≤ Uhi
. (4.2)
10One cannot do this with complete freedom as one needs   G to be a legitimate c.d.f. That is, it
must be nondecreasing in both of its arguments. However, there will typically be many examples of
k for which   G is a cdf and the model is not identiﬁed. For example, if k is a nondecreasing function
  G will be a legitimate c.d.f.
11In principle some of the elements of Zi may aﬀect ϕf and others may aﬀect ϕh, but this distinction
will not be important here so we use the most general notation.
25We continue to assume that
Yfi = gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi





Yfi if Ji = f
Yhi if Ji = h
. (4.4)
It will be useful to deﬁne a reduced form version of this model. Note that people
ﬁsh when
0 <Ufi − Uhi
=(Yfi + ϕf(Zi,X0i) + νfi) − (Yhi + ϕh(Zi,X0i) + νhi)
=gf(Xfi,X0i) + ϕf(Zi,X0i) − gh(Xhi,X0i) − ϕh(Zi,X0i) + εfi + νfi − εhi − νhi.
In the previous section we described how the choice model can only be identiﬁed up
to a monotonic transform and that assuming the error term is uniform is a convenient
normalization. We do the same thing here. Let F ∗ be the distribution function of
εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi. Then we deﬁne
νi ≡ F
∗ (εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi) (4.5)
ϕ(Zi,Xi) ≡ F
∗ (gf(Xfi,X0i) + ϕf(Zi,X0i) − gh(Xhi,X0i) − ϕh(Zi,X0i)). (4.6)
As above, this normalization is convenient because it is straightforward to show that
Ji = f when ϕ(Zi,Xi) > νi
and that νi is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
We assume that the econometrician can observe the occupations of the worker and
the wages that they receive in their chosen occupations as well as (Xi,Zi).
4.1 Identiﬁcation
It turns out that the basic assumptions that allow us to identify the Roy model also
allow us to identify the generalized Roy model.
We start with the reduced form model in which we need two more assumptions.
26Assumption 4.1. (νi,εfi,εhi) is continuously distributed and is independent of (Zi,Xi).
Furthermore, νi is distributed uniform on the unit interval and the medians of both εfi
and εhi are zero.
Assumption 4.2. The support of ϕ(Zi,x) is [0,1] for all x ∈ supp(Xi).
We also slightly extend the restrictions on the functions to include ϕf and ϕh.



















discretely (all support points have positive mass).














































Theorem 4.1. Under assumptions 4.1-4.4, ϕ,gf,gh and the joint distribution of (νi,εfi)
and of (νi,εhi) are identiﬁed from the joint distribution of (Ji,Yi) on a set X ∗ that has
measure 1 where (Ji,Yi) are generated by model (4.1)-(4.4).
(Proof in Appendix)
The intuition for identiﬁcation follows directly from the intuition given for the basic
Roy model. We show this in 3 steps:
1. Identiﬁcation of ϕ is like the “Step 1: identiﬁcation of choice model” section.
We can only identify ϕ up to a monotonic transformation for exactly the same
reason given in that section. We impose the normalization that νi is uniform in
assumption 4.2. Given that assumption
Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z,Xi = x) = ϕ(z,x)
so identiﬁcation of ϕ from Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z,Xi = x) comes directly.
272. Identiﬁcation of gf and gh are completely analogous to “Step 2: identiﬁcation of
gf” in section 3.2. That is
lim
ϕ(z,x)→1
Med(Yi | Zi = z,Xi = x,Ji = f)
= gf(xf,x0) + lim
ϕ(z,x)→1
Med(εfi | Zi = z,Xi = x,Ji = f)
= gf(xf,x0) + lim
ϕ(z,x)→1
Med(εfi | νi ≤ ϕ(z,x))
= gf(xf,x0) + Med(εfi)
= gf(xf,x0).
The analogous argument works for gh when we send ϕ(z,x) → 0.
3. Identiﬁcation of the joint distribution of (νi,εfi) and of (νi,εhi) are analogous to
the “Step 4: identiﬁcation of G” discussion in the Roy model. That is if we let
Gν,εf represent the joint distribution of (νi,εfi) then
Pr(Ji = f,Yfi ≤ y | (Zi,Xi) = (z,x)) = Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(z,x),gf(xf,x0) + εfi ≤ y)
= Gν,εf (ϕ(z,x),y − gf(xf,x0)).
The analogous argument works for the joint distribution of (νi,εhi).
Note that not all parameters are identiﬁed such as the non-pecuniary gain from
ﬁshing ϕf − ϕh. To identify the “structural” generalized Roy model we make two
additional assumptions:
Assumption 4.5. The median of εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi is zero.
Assumption 4.6. For any value of (z,x0) ∈ supp(Zi,X0i), gf(Xfi,x0) − gh(Xhi,x0)
has full support (i.e. the whole real line).
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions 4.1-4.6, ϕf−ϕh, the distribution of (εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi,εfi),
and the distribution of (εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi,εhi) are identiﬁed.
(Proof in Appendix)
Note that Theorem 4.1 gives the joint distribution of (νi,εfi) while Theorem 4.2
gives the joint distribution of (εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi,εfi). Since νi = F ∗(εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi),
this really just amounts to saying that F ∗ is identiﬁed.
28Furthermore, whereas gf and gh are identiﬁed in Theorem 4.1, ϕf −ϕh is identiﬁed
in Theorem 4.2. Recall ϕf − ϕh is the added utility (measured in money) of being a
ﬁsherman relative to a hunter. The exclusion restrictions Xfi and Xhi help us identify
this. These exclusion restrictions allow us to vary the pecuniary gains of the two
sectors, holding preferences ϕf − ϕh constant. Identiﬁcation is analogous to the “Step
3: identiﬁcation of gh” in the standard Roy model. To see where identiﬁcation comes
from, for every (z,x0) think about the following conditional median
0.5 = Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z,Xi = x)
= Pr(εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi ≤ gf(xf,x0) + ϕf(z,x0) − gh(xh,x0) − ϕh(z,x0)).
Since the median of εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi is zero, this means that
gf(xf,x0) + ϕf(z,x0) − gh(xh,x0) − ϕh(z,x0) = 0,
and thus
ϕf(z,x0) − ϕh(z,x0) = gh(xh,x0) − gf(xf,x0).
Because gf and gh is identiﬁed, ϕf − ϕh is identiﬁed also. The argument above shows
that we do not need both Xfi and Xhi, we only need Xfi or Xhi.
Suppose there is no variable that aﬀects earnings in one sector but not preferences
(Xfi or Xhi). An alternative way to identify ϕf − ϕh is to use a cost measured in
dollars. Consider the linear version of the model with normal errors and without











The reduced form probit is:













where σ is the standard deviation of εhi+νhi−εfi−νfi. Theorem 4.1 above establishes
that the functions gf and gh (i.e., γf and γh) as well as the variance of εhi and εfi are
identiﬁed. We still need to identify β0, βz and σ. Thus we are able to identify











σ ). If they are not scalars, we still have one more parameter than restriction.
However suppose that one of the exclusion restrictions represents a cost variable that
is measured in the same units as Yfi − Yhi. For example in a schooling case suppose
that Yfi represents the present value of earnings as a college graduate, Yhi represents
the present value of high school graduate as a college graduate, and the exclusion
restriction, Zi, represents the present value of college tuition. In this case βz = −1
the coeﬃcient on Zi is −1/σ, so σ is identiﬁed. Given σ it is very easy to show that
the rest of the parameters are identiﬁed as well. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998)
provide an example of this argument using tuition as in the style above. In section 7.3
we discuss Heckman and Navarro (2007) who use this approach as well.
4.2 Lack of Identiﬁcation of the Joint Distribution of (εfi,εhi)
In pointing out what is identiﬁed in the model it is also important to point out what is
not identiﬁed. Most importantly in the generalized Roy model we were able to identify
the joint distribution between the error terms in the selection equation and each of
the outcomes, but not the joint distribution of the variables in the outcome equation.
In particular the joint distribution between the error terms (εfi,εhi) is not identiﬁed.
Even strong functional form assumptions will not solve this problem. Fir example, it is
easy to show that in the joint normal model the covariance of (εfi,εhi) is not identiﬁed.
4.3 Are Functional Forms Innocuous? Evidence from Catholic
Schools
As the theorems above make clear, nonparametric identiﬁcation requires exclusion
restrictions. However, completely parametric models typically do not require exclusion
restrictions. In speciﬁc empirical examples, identiﬁcation could primarily be coming
from the exclusion restriction or identiﬁcation could be coming primarily from the
functional form assumptions (or some combination between the two). When researchers
use exclusion restrictions in data, it is important to be careful about which assumptions
are important.
We describe one example from Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005b). Based on Evans
and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997), and Neal and Grogger (2000) they consider a bivariate
30probit model of Catholic schooling and college attendance.
CHi = 1(X
′
iβ + λZi + ui > 0) (4.7)
Yi = 1(αCHi + X
′
iγ + εi > 0), (4.8)
where 1( ) is the indicator function taking the value one if its argument is true and
zero otherwise, CHi is a dummy variable indicating attendance at a Catholic school,
and Yi is a dummy variable indicating college attendance. Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect
of Catholic schooling on college attendance (or high school graduation) is the primary
focus of these studies. The question at hand is in practice whether the assumed func-
tional forms for ui and εi are important for identifying the α coeﬃcient and thus the
eﬀect of Catholic schools on college attendance.
The model in equations (4.7)-(4.8) is a minor extension of the generalized Roy
model. The ﬁrst key diﬀerence is that the outcome variable in equation (4.8) is binary
(attend college or not), whereas in the case of the Generalized Roy model the outcomes
were continuous (earnings in either sector). The second key diﬀerence is that the
outcome equation for Catholic versus Non-Catholic school only diﬀers in the intercept
(α). The error term (εi) and the slope coeﬃcients (γ) are restricted to be the same.
Nevertheless, the machinery to prove non-parametric identiﬁcation of the Generalized
Roy model can be applied to this framework.12
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 1972, Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005b) consider an array of instruments and diﬀerent speciﬁcations for equations
(4.7) and (4.8) . In Table 1 we present a subset of their results. We show four diﬀerent
models. The “Single Equation Model” gives results in which selection into Catholic
school is not accounted for. The ﬁrst column gives results from a probit model (with
point estimates, standard errors, and marginal eﬀects). The second column give results
from a Linear Probability model. Next we present the estimates of α from a Bivariate
Probit models with alternative exclusion restrictions. The ﬁnal row presents the results
with no exclusion restrictions. Finally we also present results from an instrumental
variable linear probability model with the same set of exclusion restrictions.
12Following Matzkin (1992), we need a monotonic normalization on the outcome model (such as
assuming the error term is uniform). Once we have done this, proving identiﬁcation of this model is
almost identical to the generalized Roy model and is easily done with an exclusion restriction with
suﬃcient support.
31Table 1
Estimated Eﬀects of Catholic Schools on College Attendance:

















Notes: Source: Altonji, Elder, Taber (2005b). Urban Non-Whites from NLS-72.
The ﬁrst set of results come from simple probits and from OLS.
The further results come from Bivariate Probits and from two stage least squares.
We present the marginal eﬀect of Catholic high school attendance on college attendance.
[Point Estimate from Probit in Brackets]
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
One can see that the marginal eﬀect from the single equation probit is very similar
to the OLS estimate. It indicates that college attendance rates are approximately 23.9
percentage points higher for Catholic high school graduates than for public high school
32graduates. The rest of the table presents results from three bivariate probit models
and two instrumental variables models using alternative exclusion restrictions. The
problem is clearest when the interaction between the student coming from a Catholic
school and distance to the nearest Catholic school is used as an instrument. The 2SLS
gives nonsensical results: a coeﬃcient of 2.572 with an enormous standard error. This
indicates that the instrument has little power. However, the bivariate probit result is
more reasonable. It suggests that the true marginal causal eﬀect is around 0.478 and
the point estimate is statistically signiﬁcant. This seems inconsistent with the 2SLS
results which indicated that this exclusion restriction had very little power. However
it is clear what is going on when we compare this result to the model at the bottom of
the table without an exclusion restriction. The estimate is very similar with a similar
standard error. The linearity and normality assumptions drive the results.
The case in which Catholic religion by itself is used as an instrument is less prob-
lematic. The IV result suggests a strong amount of positive selection but still yields a
large standard error. The bivariate probit model suggests a marginal eﬀect that is a bit
larger than the OLS eﬀect. However, note that the standard error for the model with
and without an exclusion restriction are quite similar which seems inconsistent with the
idea that the exclusion restriction is providing a lot of identifying information. Further
note that the IV result suggests a strong positive selection bias while the bivariate
probit without exclusion restrictions suggests a strong negative bias. The bivariate
probit in which Catholic is excluded is somewhere between the two. This suggests that
both functional form and exclusion restrictions are important in this case. We should
emphasize the “suggests” part of this sentence as none of this is a formal test. It does,
however, make one wonder how much trust to put in the bivariate probit results by
themselves.
Another paper documenting the importance of functional form assumptions is Das
et al. (2003), who estimate the return to education for young Australian women. They
estimate equations for years of education, the probability of working, and wages. When
estimating the wage equation they address both the endogeneity of years of education
and also selection caused because we only observe wages for workers. They allow for
ﬂexibility in the returns to education (where the return depends on years of education)
and also in the distribution of the residuals. They ﬁnd that when they assume normality
33of the error terms, the return to education is approximately 12%, regardless of years
of education. However, once they allow for more ﬂexible functional forms for the error
terms, they ﬁnd that the returns to education decline sharply with years of education.
For example, they ﬁnd that at 10 years of education, the return to education is over
15%. However, at 14 years, the return to education is only about 5%.
5 Treatment Eﬀects
There is a very large literature on the estimation of treatment eﬀects. For more com-
plete summaries see Heckman and Robb (1986), Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999),
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,2007b), Abbring and Heckman (2007), or Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009).13 DiNardo and Lee (2010) provide a discussion that is complemen-
tary to ours. Our goal in this section is not to survey the whole literature but provide
a brief summary and to put it into the context of identiﬁcation of the Generalized Roy
Model.
The goal of this literature is to estimate the value of receiving a treatment deﬁned
as:
πi = Yfi − Yhi. (5.1)
In the context of the Roy model, πi is the income gain from moving from hunting to
ﬁshing. This income gain potentially varies across individuals in the population. Thus
for people who choose to be ﬁshermen, πi is positive and for people who choose to be
hunters, πi is negative.
Estimation of treatment eﬀects is of great interest in many literatures. The term
“treatment eﬀect”makes the most sense in the context the medical literature. Choice
f could represent taking a medical treatment (such as an experimental drug) while h
could represent no treatment. In that case Yfi and Yhi would represent some measure
of health status for individual i with and without the treatment. Thus the treatment
eﬀect πi is the eﬀect of the drug on the health outcome for individual i.
The classic example in labor economics is job training. In that case, Yfi would
13There is also a substantial literature on the tradeoﬀs between diﬀerent empirical approaches. Key
papers include Leamer (1983), Heckman (1979, 1999, 2000), Angrist and Imbens (1999), Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (2000), Deaton (2009), Heckman and Urzua (2009), Imbens (2009), Angrist and Pischke
(2010), Sims (2010).
34represent a labor market outcome for individuals who received training and Yhi would
represents the outcome in the absence of training.
In both the case of drug treatment and job training, empirical researchers have
exploited randomized trials. Medical patients are often randomly assigned either a
treatment or a placebo (i.e., a sugar pill that should have no eﬀect on health). Likewise,
many job training programs are randomly assigned. For example, in the case of the
Job Training Partnership Act, a large number of unemployed individuals applied for
job training (see e.g. Bloom et. al., 1997). Of those who applied for training, some
were assigned training and some were assigned no training.
Because assignment is random and aﬀects the level of treatment, one can treat
assignment as an exclusion restriction that is correlated with treatment (i.e., the prob-
ability that Ji = f) but is uncorrelated with preferences or ability because it is random.
In this sense, random assignment solves the selection problem that is the focus of the
Roy model. As we show below, exogenous variation provided by experiments allows the
researcher to cleanly identify some properties of the distribution of Yfi and Yhi under
relatively weak assumptions. Furthermore, the methods for estimating these objects
are simple, which adds to their appeal.
The treatment eﬀect framework is also widely used for evaluating quasi-experimental
data as well. By quasi-experimental data, we mean data that are not experimental,
but exploit variation that is “almost as good as” random assignment.
5.1 Treatment Eﬀects and the Generalized Roy Model
Within the context of the generalized Roy model note that in general
πi = gf(Xfi,X0i) − gh(Xhi,X0i) + εfi − εhi.
An important special case of the treatment eﬀect deﬁned in equation (5.1) is when
gf(Xfi,X0i) = gh(Xhi,X0i) + π0 (5.2)
εfi = εhi. (5.3)
In this case, the treatment eﬀect πi = Yfi − Yhi = π0 is a constant across individuals.
Identiﬁcation of this parameter is relatively straightforward. However, there is a sub-
stantial literature that studies identiﬁcation of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. As we
35point out above, treatment eﬀects are positive for some people and negative for others
in the context of the Roy model. Furthermore, there is ample empirical evidence that
the returns to job training are not constant, but instead vary across the population
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999).
In section 4.2 we explain why the joint distribution of (εfi,εhi) is not identiﬁed. This
means that the distribution of πi is not identiﬁed and even relatively simple summary
statistics like the median of this distribution is not identiﬁed in general. The key
problem is that even when assignment is random, we do not observe the same people
in both occupations.
Since the full generalized Roy model is complicated, hard to describe, and very de-
manding in terms of data, researchers often focus on a summary statistic to summarize
the result. The most common in this literature is the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE)
deﬁned as
ATE ≡ E(πi)
= E(Yfi) − E(Yhi).
From Theorem 4.1 we know that (under the assumptions of that theorem) the
distribution of Yfi and Yhi are identiﬁed. Thus, their expected values are also identiﬁed
under the one additional assumption that these expected values exist.
Assumption 5.1. The expected values of Yfi and Yhi are ﬁnite
Theorem 5.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 and Assumption 5.1, the Av-
erage Treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed.
(Proof in Appendix)
To see where identiﬁcation of this object comes from, abstract from Xi so that
the only observable is Zi, which aﬀects the non-pecuniary gain in utility from occu-
pation across occupations. With experimental data, Zi could be randomly generated
assignments to occupation. Notice that
lim
ϕ(z)→1
E(Yfi | Zi = z,Ji = f) − lim
ϕ(z)→0
E(Yhi | Zi = z,Ji = h)
= lim
ϕ(z)→1
E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(z)) − lim
ϕ(z)→0
E(Yhi | νi > ϕ(z))
= E(Yfi) − E(Yhi).
36Thus the exclusion restriction is the key to identiﬁcation. Note also that we need
groups of individuals where ϕ(Zi) ≈ 1 (who are always ﬁshermen) and ϕ(Zi) ≈ 0 (who
are always hunters); thus “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity” is essential as well. For the reasons
discussed in the nonparametric Roy model above, if ϕ(Zi) were never higher than some
ϕ(zu) < 1 then E(Yfi) would not be identiﬁed. Similarly if ϕ(Zi) were never lower
then some ϕ(zℓ) > 0, then E(Yhi) would not be identiﬁed.
While one could directly estimate the the ATE using “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity,”
as described above this is not the common practice and not something we would ad-
vocate. The standard approach would be to estimate the full Generalized Roy Model
and then use it to simulate the various treatment eﬀects. This is often done using a
completely parametric approach as in, for example, the classic paper by Willis and
Rosen (1979). However, there are quite a few nonparametric alternatives as well, in-
cluding construction of the Marginal Treatment eﬀects as discussed in section 5.3 and
5.4 below.
As it turns out, even with experimental data, it is rarely the case that ϕ(Zi) is
identically one or zero with positive probability. In the case of medicine, some people
assigned the treatment do not take the treatment. In the training example, many
people who are oﬀered subsidized training decide not to undergo the training. Thus,
when compliance with assignment is less than 100%, we cannot recover the ATE. In
Section 5.2 we discuss more precisely what we do recover when there is less than 100%
compliance.
It is also instructive to relate the ATE to instrumental variables estimation. Let Yi





Yfi if Ji = f
Yhi if Ji = h
,
and let Dfi be a dummy variable indicating whether Ji = f. Consider estimating the
model
Yi = β0 + β1Dfi + ui (5.4)
using instrumental variables with Zi as an instrument for Dfi. Assume that Zi is
correlated with Dfi but not with Yfi or Yhi. Consider ﬁrst the constant treatment
eﬀect model described in equations (5.2) and (5.3) so that πi = π0 for everyone in the
37population. In that case
Yi = YfiDfi + Yhi(1 − Dfi)
= Yhi + Dfi(Yfi − Yhi)
= Yhi + Dfiπ0.
Then two stage least squares on the model above yields













Thus in the constant treatment eﬀect model, instrumental variables provides a con-
sistent estimate of the treatment eﬀect. However, this result does not carry over to
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects and the average treatment eﬀects as Heckman (1997)
shows. Following the expression above we get






 = ATE (5.5)
in general. In sections 5.2 and 5.3 below, we describe what instrumental variables
identiﬁes.
In practice there are two potential problems with the assumptions behind Theorem
5.1 above
• The researcher may not have a valid exclusion restriction. We discuss some of
the options for this case in Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.
• Even if they do, the variable may not have full support. By this we mean that the
instrumental variable Zi may not vary enough so that for some observed values
of Zi everyone is always a ﬁsherman and for other observed values of Zi everyone
38is always a hunter. We discuss what can be identiﬁed using exclusion restrictions
with limited support in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.6.
We discuss a number of diﬀerent approaches some of which assumes an exclusion re-
striction but relaxes the support conditions and others that do not require exclusion
restrictions.
5.2 Local Average Treatment Eﬀects
Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) consider identiﬁca-
tion when the support of Zi takes on a ﬁnite number of points. They show that when
varying the instrument over this range, they can identify what they call a Local Aver-
age Treatment Eﬀect. Furthermore, they show how instrumental variables can be used
to estimate it. It is again easiest to think about this problem after abstracting from Xi,
as it is straightforward to condition on these variables (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994,
for details). For simplicity’s sake, consider the case in which the instrument Zi is bi-
nary and takes on the values {0,1}. In many cases not only is the instrument discrete,
but it is also binary. For example, in randomized medical trials, Zi = 1 represents
assignment to treatment, whereas Zi = 0 represents assignment to the placebo. In
job training programs, Zi = 1 represents assignment to the training program, whereas
Zi = 0 represents no assigned training.
It is important to point out that not all patients assigned treatment actually receive
the treatment. Thus Ji = f if the patient actually takes the drug and Ji = h if the
individual does not take the drug. Likewise, not all individuals who are assigned
training actually receive the training, so Ji = f if the individual goes to training and
Ji = h if she does not. The literature on Local Average Treatment Eﬀects handles this
case as well as many others. However, we do require that the instrument of assignment
has power: Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1)  = Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 0). Without loss of generality we
will assume that Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) > Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 0).
Using the reduced form version of the generalized Roy model the choice problem is
Ji = f if ϕ(Zi) > νi (5.6)
where νi is uniformly distributed.
39The following six objects can be learned directly from the data:
Pr(Ji = f|Zi = 0) = Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0))
Pr(Ji = f|Zi = 1) = Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1))
E(Yfi | Zi = 0,Ji = f) = E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(0))
E(Yhi | Zi = 0,Ji = h) = E(Yhi | νi > ϕ(0))
E(Yfi | Zi = 1,Ji = f) = E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(1))
E(Yhi | Zi = 1,Ji = h) = E(Yhi | νi > ϕ(1)),
The above equations show that our earlier assumption that Pr(Ji = f|Zi = 1) >
Pr(Ji = f|Zi = 0) implies Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1)) > Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0)). This, combined with the
structure embedded in equation (5.6) means that
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1)|νi ≤ ϕ(0)) = 1, (5.7)
so then an individual who is a ﬁsherman when Zi = 0 is also a ﬁsherman when Zi = 1.
Similar reasoning implies Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1)|ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1)) = 1. Using this and Bayes
rule yields
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0) | νi ≤ ϕ(1)) =






Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1) | νi ≤ ϕ(1)) =
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1) | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1))
=
Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1))
(5.9)
Using the fact that Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1)) = Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0)) + Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1)), one can
show that
E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(1)) =E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(0))Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0) | νi ≤ ϕ(1))
+ E(Yfi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1) | νi ≤ ϕ(1))
(5.10)
40Combining equation (5.10) with equations (5.8) and (5.9) yields
E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(1)) =
E(Yfi | νi ≤ ϕ(0))Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(0))
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1))
+
E(Yfi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(1))
(5.11)
Rearranging equation (5.11) shows that we can identify
E(Yfi | ϕ(0) ≤ νi < ϕ(1))
=
E(Yfi | Zi = 1,Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) − E(Yfi | Zi = 0,Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 0)
Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) − Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 0)
(5.12)
since everything on the right hand side is directly identiﬁed from the data.
Using the analogous argument one can show that
E(Yhi | ϕ(0) ≤ νi < ϕ(1))
=
E(Yhi | Zi = 0,Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 0) − E(Yhi | Zi = 1,Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 1)
Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) − Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 0)
is identiﬁed. But this means that we can identify
E(πi | ϕ(0) ≤ νi < ϕ(1)) = E(Yfi − Yhi | ϕ(0) ≤ νi < ϕ(1)) (5.13)
which Imbens and Angrist (1994) deﬁne as the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect. This
is the average treatment eﬀect for that group of individuals who would alter their
treatment status if their value of Zi changed. Given the variation in Zi, this is the only
group for whom we can identify a treatment eﬀect. Any individual in the data with
νi > ϕ(1) would never choose Ji = f, so the data are silent about E(Yfi | νi > ϕ(1)).
Similarly the data is silent about E(Yhi | νi ≤ ϕ(0)).
Imbens and Angrist (1994) also show that the standard linear Instrumental Vari-
ables estimator yield consistent estimates of Local Average Treatment Eﬀects. Consider
the instrumental variables estimator of equation (5.4)
Yi = β0 + β1Dfi + ui







E(πiDfiZi) − E (πiDfi)E (Zi)
E(DfiZi) − E (Dfi)E (Zi)
41Let Pz denote the probability that Zi = 1. The numerator of the above expression
is
E(πiDfiZi) − E (πiDfi)E (Zi)
= PzE(πiDfi | Zi = 1) − E (πiDfi)Pz
= PzE(πiDfi | Zi = 1) − [PzE(πiDfi | Zi = 1) + (1 − Pz)E(πi,Dfi | Zi = 0)]Pz
= Pz(1 − Pz)[E(πiDfi | Zi = 1) − E(πiDfi | Zi = 0)]
= Pz(1 − Pz)E(πi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
where the key simpliﬁcation comes from the fact that
E(πiDfi | Zi = 1) = E (πi1(νi ≤ ϕ(1)))
= E (πi [1(νi ≤ ϕ(0)) + 1(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))])
= E(πiDfi | Zi = 0) + E(πi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1)).
Next consider the denominator
E(DfiZi) − E (Dfi)E (Zi)
= PzE(Dfi | Zi = 1) − E (Dfi)Pz
= PzE(Dfi | Zi = 1) − [PzE(Dfi | Zi = 1) + (1 − Pz)E(Dfi | Zi = 0)]Pz
= Pz(1 − Pz)[E(Dfi | Zi = 1) − E(Dfi | Zi = 0)]





E(πiDfiZi) − E (πiDfi)E (Zi)
E(DfiZi) − E (Dfi)E (Zi)
=
Pz(1 − Pz)E(πi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
Pz(1 − Pz)Pr(ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
= E(πi | ϕ(0) < νi ≤ ϕ(1))
Imbens and Angrist never explicitly use the generalized Roy model or the latent
index framework. Instead, they write their problem only in terms of the choice prob-
abilities. However, in order to do this they must make one additional assumption.
Speciﬁcally, they assume that if Ji = f when Zi = 0 then Ji = f when Zi = 1. Thus
42changing Zi = 0 to Zi = 1 never causes some people to switch from ﬁshing to hunting.
It only causes people to switch from hunting to ﬁshing. They refer to this as a mono-
tonicity assumption. Vytlacil (2002) points out that this is implied by the latent index
model when the index ϕ(Zi) is separable from νi as we assumed in equation (5.6). As is
implied by equation (5.7), increasing the index ϕ(Zi) will cause some people to switch
from hunting to ﬁshing, but not the reverse.14
Throughout, we use the latent index framework that is embedded in the Generalized
Roy model, for three reasons. First, we can appeal to the identiﬁcation results of the
Generalized Roy model. Second, the latent index can be interpreted as the added utility
from making a decision. Thus we can use the estimated model for welfare analysis.
Third, placing the choice in an optimizing framework allows us to test the restrictions
on choice that come from the theory of optimization.
As we have pointed out, not everyone oﬀered training actually takes the training.
For example, in the case of the JTPA, only 60% of those oﬀered the training actually
received it (Bloom et al., 1997). Presumably, those who took the training are those
who stood the most to gain from the training. For example, the reason that many
people do not take training is that they receive a job oﬀer before training begins. For
these people, the training may have been of relatively little value. Furthermore, 2% of
those who applied for and were not assigned training program wind up receiving the
training (Bloom et al., 1997). Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) refer to those who
were assigned training, but did not take the training as never-takers. Those who receive
the training whether or not they are assigned are always-takers. Those who receive the
training only when assigned the training are compliers. In terms of the latent index
framework, the never-takers are those for whom (νi ≥ ϕ(1)), the compliers are those
for whom (ϕ(0) ≤ νi < ϕ(1)), and the always-takers are those for whom (νi < ϕ(0)).
The monotonicity assumption embedded in the latent index framework rules out
the existence of a ﬁnal group: the deﬁers. In the context of training, this would be
an individual who receives training when not assigned training but would not receive
training when assigned. At least in the context of training programs (and many other
contexts) it seems safe to assume that there are no deﬁers.
14However, he points out that the non-separable model Dfi = 1(f(Zi,νi) > 0) does not necessarily
give rise to monotonicity. All other diﬀerences between the latent variable framework and the LATE
framework are extremely technical and minor.
435.3 Marginal Treatment Eﬀects
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005, 2007b) develop a framework that is useful for
constructing many types of treatment eﬀects. They focus on the marginal treatment
eﬀect (MTE) deﬁned in our context as
∆
MTE(x,ν) ≡ E(πi | Xi = x,νi = ν).
They show formally how to identify this object. We present their methodology using
our notation.
Note that if we allow for regressors Xi, let the exclusion restriction Zi to take on
values beyond zero and one, then if (zℓ,x) and (zh,x) are in the support of the data,






≤ νi < ϕ(z
h,x),Xi = x)
=
E(Yfi | (Zi,Xi) = (zh,x),Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f | (Zi,Xi) = (zh,x))
Pr(Ji = f | (Zi,Xi) = (zh,x)) − Pr(Ji = f | (Zi,Xi) = (zℓ,x))
−
E(Yfi | (Zi,Xi) = (zℓ,x),Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f | (Zi,Xi) = (zℓ,x))














≤ νi < ϕ(z
h,x),Xi = x) = E(Yfi | νi = ν,Xi = x).
Thus if (x,ν) is in the support of (Xi,ϕ(Zi,Xi)), then E(Yfi | νi = ν,Xi = x) is
identiﬁed. Since the model is symmetric, under similar conditions E(Yhi | νi = ν,Xi =
x) is identiﬁed as well. Finally since
∆
MTE(x,ν) = E(πi | Xi = x,νi = ν)
= E(Yfi | νi = ν,Xi = x) − E(Yhi | νi = ν,Xi = x), (5.15)
the marginal treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed.
The marginal treatment eﬀect is interesting in its own right. It is the value of the
treatment for any individual with Xi = x and νi = ν. In addition, it is also useful
because the diﬀerent types of treatment eﬀects can be deﬁned in terms of the marginal
treatment eﬀect. For example
ATE =




44One can see from this expression that without full support this will not be identiﬁed
because ∆MTE(x,ν) will not be identiﬁed everywhere.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) also show that the instrumental variables estimator





where they give an explicit functional form for hIV. It is complicated enough that we
do not repeat it here but it can be found in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
This framework is also useful for seeing what is not identiﬁed. In particular if
ϕ(Zi,x) does not have full support so that it is bounded above or below the average
treatment eﬀect will not be identiﬁed. However, many other interesting treatment
eﬀects can be identiﬁed. For example, the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect in a model






More generally, in this series of papers, Heckman and Vytlacil show that the
marginal treatment eﬀect can also be used to organize many ideas in the literature.
One interesting case is policy eﬀects. They deﬁne the policy relevant treatment eﬀect
as the treatment resulting from a particular policy. They show that if the relation-
ship between the policy and the observable covariates is known, the policy relevant
treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed from the marginal treatment eﬀects.
5.4 Applications of the Marginal Treatment Eﬀects Approach
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,2001,2005) suggest procedures to estimate the marginal
treatment eﬀect. They suggest what they call “local instrumental variables.” Using
our notation for the generalized Roy model in which Ji = f when ϕ(Xi,Zi) − νi > 0
where νi is uniformly distributed, they show that
∆
MTE(x,ν) =
∂E(Yi | Xi = x,ϕ(Xi,Zi) = ν)
∂ν
.
45To see why this is the same deﬁnition of MTE as in equation (5.15), note that
∂E(Yi | Xi = x,ϕ(Xi,Zi) = ν)
∂ν
=




   ν
0 E(Yfi | νi = ω,Xi = x)dω +
  1
ν E(Yhi | νi = ω,Xi = x)dω
 
∂ν
= E(Yfi | νi = ν,Xi = x) − E(Yhi | νi = ν,Xi = x)
= ∆
MTE(x,ν).
Thus one can estimate the marginal treatment eﬀect in three steps. First estimate
ϕ, second estimate E(Y | Xi = x,ϕ(Xi,Zi) = ν) using some type of nonparametric
regression approach, and third take the derivative.
Because as a normalization νi is uniformly distributed
ϕ(x,z) = Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(Xi,Zi) | Xi = x,Zi = z)
= Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x,Zi = z)
= E(Dfi | Xi = x,Zi = z).
Thus we can estimate ϕ(x,z) from a nonparametric regression of Dfi on (Xi,Zi).
A very simple way to do this is to use a linear probability model of Dfi regressed
on a polynomial of Zi. By letting the terms in the polynomial get large with the
sample size, this can be considered a nonparametric estimator. For the second stage
we regress the outcome Yi on a polynomial of our estimate of ϕ(Zi). To see how this
works consider the case in which both polynomials are quadratics. We would use the
following two stage least squares procedure:
Dfi = γ0 + γ1Zi + γ2Z
2
i + γxXi + ei, (5.17)
Yi = β0 + β1  Dfi + β2  Dfi
2
+ βxXi + ui, (5.18)
where   Dfi =   γ0 +   γ1Zi +   γ2Z2
i +   γxXi is the predicted value from the ﬁrst stage. The
β2 coeﬃcient may not be 0 because as we change   Dfi the instrument aﬀects diﬀerent




= β1 + 2β2  Dfi. (5.19)
46Although the polynomial procedure above is transparent, the most common technique
used to estimate the MTE is local linear regression.
French and Song (2010) estimate the labor supply response to Disability Insurance
(DI) receipt for DI applicants. Individuals are deemed eligible for DI beneﬁts if they
are “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity”-i.e., if they are unable to work.
Beneﬁciaries receive, on average $12,000 per year, plus Medicare health insurance.
Thus, there are strong incentives to apply for beneﬁts. They continue to receive these
beneﬁts only if they earn less than a certain amount per year ($10,800 in 2007). For
this reason, the DI system likely has strong labor supply disincentives. A healthy DI
recipient is unlikely to work if that causes the loss of DI and health insurance beneﬁts.
The DI system attempts to allow beneﬁts only to those who are truly disabled.
Many DI applicants have their case heard by a judge who determines those who are
truly disabled. Some applicants appear more disabled than others. The most disabled
applicants are unable to work, and thus will not work whether or not they get the
beneﬁt. For less serious cases, the applicant will work, but only if she is denied beneﬁts.
The question, then, is what is the optimal threshold level for the amount of observed
disability before the individual is allowed beneﬁts? Given the deﬁnition of disability,
this threshold should depend on the probability that an individual does not work,
even when denied the beneﬁt. Furthermore, optimal taxation arguments suggest that
beneﬁts should be given to groups whose labor supply is insensitive to beneﬁt allowance.
Thus the eﬀect of DI allowance on labor supply is of great interest to policy makers.
OLS is likely to be inconsistent because those who are allowed beneﬁts are likely to
be less healthy than those who are denied. Those allowed beneﬁts would have had low
earnings even if they did not receive beneﬁts. French and Song propose an IV estimator
using the process of assignment of cases to judges. Cases are assigned to judges on a
rotational basis within each hearing oﬃce, which means that for all practical purposes,
judges are randomly assigned to cases conditional on the hearing oﬃce and the day.
Some judges are much more lenient than others. For example, the least lenient 5%
of all judges allow beneﬁts to less than 45% of the cases they hear, whereas the most
lenient 5% of all judges allow beneﬁts to 80% of all the cases they hear. Although
some of those who are denied beneﬁts appeal and get beneﬁts later, most do not. If
assignment of cases to judges is random then the instrument of judge assignment is a
47plausibly exogenous instrument. Furthermore, and as long as judges vary in terms of
leniency and not ability to detect individuals who are disabled,15 the instrument can
identify a MTE.
French and Song use a two stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage they estimate the
probability that an individual is allowed beneﬁts, conditional on the average judge
speciﬁc allowance rate. They estimate a version of equation (5.17) where Dfi is an
indicator equal to 1 if case i was allowed beneﬁts and Zi is the average allowance rate
of the judge who heard case i. In the second stage they estimate earnings conditional on
whether the individual was allowed beneﬁts (as predicted by the judge speciﬁc allowance
rate). They estimate a version of equation (5.18) where Yi is annual earnings 5 years
after assignment to a judge. Figure 1 shows the estimated MTE (using the formula
in equation (5.19)) using several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of polynomial in the ﬁrst and
second stage equations. Assuming that the treatment eﬀect is constant (i.e., β2 = 0),
they ﬁnd that annual earnings 5 years after assignment to a judge are $1,500 for those
allowed beneﬁts and $3,900 for those denied beneﬁts, so the estimated treatment eﬀect
is $2,400. This is the MTE-linear case in Figure 1. However, this masks considerable
heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects. They ﬁnd that when allowance rates rise, the
labor supply response of the marginal case also rises. When allowing for the quadratic
term β2 to be non-zero, they ﬁnd that less lenient judges (who allow 45% of all cases)
have a MTE of a $1,800 decline in earnings. More lenient judges (who allow 80% of
all cases) have a MTE of $3,200 decline in earnings. Figure 1 also shows results when
allowing for cubic and quartic terms in the polynomials in the ﬁrst and second stage
equations. This result is consistent with the notion that as allowance rates rise, more
healthy individuals are allowed beneﬁts. These healthier individuals are more likely to
work when not receiving DI beneﬁts, and thus their labor supply response to DI receipt
is greater.
One problem with an instrument such as this is that the instrument lacks full
support. Even the most lenient judge does not allow everyone beneﬁts. Even the
strictest judge does not deny everyone. However, the current policy debate is whether
the thresholds should be changed by only a modest amount. For this reason, the MTE
15If judges vary in terms of ability to detect disability, then a case that is allowed by a low allowance
judge might be denied by a high allowance judge. This would violate the monotonicity assumption
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Figure 1: Marginal Treatment Effect
on the support of the data is the eﬀect of interest, whereas the ATE is not.
Doyle (2007) estimates the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect of foster care on future earn-
ings and other outcomes. Foster care likely increases earnings of some children but
decreases it for others. For the most serious child abuse cases, foster care will likely
help the child. For less serious cases, the child is probably best left at home. The
question, then, is at what point should the child abuse investigator remove the child
from the household? What is the optimal threshold level for the amount of observed
abuse before which the child is removed from the household and placed into foster care?
Only children from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are placed in foster care.
They would have had low earnings even if they were not placed in foster care. Thus,
OLS estimates are likely inconsistent. To overcome this problem, Doyle uses IV. Case
investigators are assigned to cases on a rotational basis, conditional on time and the
49location of the case. Case investigators are assigned to possible child abuse cases
after a complaint of possible child abuse is made (by the child’s teacher, for example).
Investigators have a great deal of latitude about whether the child should be sent into
foster care. Furthermore, some investigators are much more lenient than others. For
example, one standard deviation in the case manager removal diﬀerential (the diﬀerence
between his average removal rate and the removal rate of other investigators who handle
cases at the same time and place) is 10%. Whether the child is removed from the home
is a good predictor of whether the child is sent to foster care. So long as assignment of
cases to investigators is random and investigators only vary in terms of leniency (and
not ability to detect child abuse) then the instrument of investigator assignment is a
useful and plausibly exogenous instrument.
Doyle uses a two stage procedure where in the ﬁrst stage he estimates the probability
that a child is placed in foster care as a function of the investigator removal rate. In the
second stage he estimates adult earnings as a function of whether the child was placed
in foster care (as predicted by the instrument). He ﬁnds that children placed into
foster care earn less than those not placed into foster care over most of the range of the
data. Two stage least squares estimates reveal that foster care reduces adult quarterly
earnings by about $1000, which is very close to average earnings. Interestingly, he ﬁnds
that when child foster care placement rates rise, earnings of the marginal case fall. For
example, earnings of the marginal child handled by a lenient investigator (who places
only 20% of the children in foster care) are unaﬀected by placement. For less lenient
investigators, who place 25% of the cases in foster care, earnings of the marginal case
decline by over $1500.
Carneiro and Lee (2009) estimate the counterfactual marginal distributions of wages
for college and high school graduates, and examine who enters college. They ﬁnd that
those with the highest returns are the most likely to attend college. Thus, increases
in college cause changes in the distribution of ability among college and high school
graduates. For ﬁxed skill prices, they ﬁnd that a 14% increase in college participation
(analogous to the increase observed in the 1980s), reduces the college premium by 12%.
Likewise, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010) ﬁnd that while the conventional IV
estimate of the return to schooling (using distance to a college and local labor market
conditions as the instruments) is 0.095, the estimated marginal return to a policy that
50expands each individual’s probability of attending college by the same proportion is
only 0.015.
5.5 Selection on Observables
Perhaps the simplest and most common assumption is that assignment of the treat-
ment is random conditional on observable covariates (sometimes referred to as uncon-
foundedness). The easiest way to think about this is that the selection error term is
independent of the other error terms:
Assumption 5.2.
Ji = f when ϕ(Xi) > νi
where νi is independent of (εfi,εhi).
We continue to assume that Yfi = gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi and Yhi = gh(Xhi,X0i) + εhi.
Note that we have explicitly dropped Zi from the model as we consider cases in which
we do not have exclusion restrictions. The implication of this assumption is that
unobservable factors that determine one’s income as a ﬁsherman do not aﬀect the
choice to become a ﬁsherman. That is while it allows for selection on observables in a
very general way, it does not allow for selection on unobservables.
Interestingly, this is still not enough for us to identify the Average Treatment Eﬀect.
If there are values of observable covariates Xi for which Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = 1 or
Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = 0 the model is not identiﬁed. If Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) = 1 then
it is straight forward to identify E(Yfi | Xi = x), but E(Yhi | Xi = x) is not identiﬁed.
Thus we need the additional assumption
Assumption 5.3. For almost all x in the support of Xi,
0 < Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x) < 1
Theorem 5.2. Under assumptions 5.2 and 5.3 the Average Treatment Eﬀect is iden-
tiﬁed
(Proof in Appendix)
51Estimation in this case is relatively straightforward. One can use matching16 or
regression analysis to estimate the average treatment eﬀect.
5.6 Set Identiﬁcation of Treatment Eﬀects
In our original discussion of identiﬁcation we deﬁned Ψ(Θ(P)) as “the set of values of
ψ that are consistent with the data distribution P.” We said that ψ was identiﬁed if
this set was a singleton. However, there is another concept of identiﬁcation we have
not discussed until this point which is set identiﬁcation. Sometimes we may be inter-
ested in a parameter that is not point identiﬁed, but this does not mean we cannot
say anything about it. In this subsection we consider the case of set identiﬁcation (i.e.
trying to characterize the set Ψ(Θ(P))) focusing on the case in which ψ is the Average
Treatment Eﬀect. Suppose that we have some prior knowledge (possibly an exclusion
restriction that gives us a LATE). What can we learn about the ATE without making
any functional form assumptions? In a series of papers Manski (1989,1990,1995,1997)
and Manski and Pepper (2000,2009) develop procedures to derive set estimators of
the Average Treatment Eﬀect and other parameters given weak assumptions. By “set
identiﬁcation” we mean the set of possible Average Treatment Eﬀects given the as-
sumptions placed on the the data. Throughout this section we will continue to assume
that the structure of the Generalized Roy model holds and we derive results under these
assumptions. In many cases the papers we mentioned did not impose this structure
and get more general results.
Following Manski (1990) or Manski (1995), notice that
E (Yfi) = E(Yfi | Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f) + E(Yfi | Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h) (5.20)
E (Yhi) = E(Yhi | Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h) + E(Yhi | Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f). (5.21)
We observe all of the objects in equations (5.20) and (5.21) except E(Yfi | Ji = h)
and E(Yhi | Ji = f). The data are completely uninformative about these two objects.
However, suppose we have some prior knowledge about the support of Yfi and Yhi. In
particular, suppose that the support of Yfi and Yhi are bounded above by yu and from
16Our focus is on identiﬁcation rather than estimation. Thus we avoid a discussion of matching
estimators. See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), or Dinardo
and Lee (2010) for discussion.
52below by yℓ. Thus, by assumption yu ≥ E(Yfi | Ji = h) ≥ yℓ and yu ≥ E(Yhi | Ji =
f) ≥ yℓ. Using these assumptions and equations (5.20) and (5.21) we can establish
that
E(Yfi |Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f) + y
ℓPr(Ji = h)
≤ E (Yfi) ≤ E(Yfi | Ji = f)Pr(Ji = f) + y
uPr(Ji = h) (5.22)
E(Yhi |Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h) + y
ℓPr(Ji = f)
≤ E (Yhi) ≤ E(Yhi | Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h) + y
uPr(Ji = f). (5.23)
Using these bounds and the deﬁnition of the ATE
ATE = E (Yfi) − E (Yhi) (5.24)
yields
 















E(Yhi | Ji = h)Pr(Ji = h) + y
ℓPr(Ji = f)
 
In practice the bounds above can yield wide ranges and are often not particularly
informative. A number of other assumptions can be used to decrease the size of the
identiﬁed set.
Manski (1990,1995) shows that one method of tightening the bounds is with an
instrumental variable. We can write the expressions (5.20) and (5.21) conditional on
Zi = z for any z ∈ supp(Zi) as for each j ∈ {f,h},
E (Yji|Zi = z) = E(Yji | Ji = f,Zi = z)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z)
+ E(Yji | Ji = h,Zi = z)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = z) (5.25)
Since Zi is, by assumption, mean independent of Yfi and Yhi (it only aﬀects the proba-
bility of choosing one occupation versus the other), then E (Yfi|Zi = z) = E (Yfi) and
E (Yhi|Zi = z) = E(Yhi). Assume there is a binary instrumental variable, Zi, which
equals either 0 or 1. We can then follow exactly the same argument as in equations
53(5.22) and (5.23), but conditioning on Zi and using equation (5.25) yields
E(Yfi | Ji = f,Zi = 1)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) + y
ℓPr(Ji = h | Zi = 1)
≤E (Yfi) ≤
≤ E(Yfi | Ji = f,Zi = 1)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) + y
uPr(Ji = h | Zi = 1) (5.26)
E(Yhi | Ji = h,Zi = 0)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 0) + y
ℓPr(Ji = f | Zi = 0)
≤E (Yhi) ≤
E(Yhi | Ji = h,Zi = 0)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 0) + y
uPr(Ji = f | Zi = 0). (5.27)
Thus we can bound ATE = E(Yfi)−E(Yhi) from below by subtracting (5.27) from
(5.26):
E(Yfi | Ji = f,Zi = 1)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) + y
ℓPr(Ji = h | Zi = 1)
− E(Yhi | Ji = h,Zi = 0)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 0) + y
uPr(Ji = f | Zi = 0)
≤ATE ≤
E(Yfi | Ji = f,Zi = 1)Pr(Ji = f | Zi = 1) + y
uPr(Ji = h | Zi = 1)
− E(Yhi | Ji = h,Z = 0)Pr(Ji = h | Zi = 0) + y
ℓPr(Ji = f | Zi = 0). (5.28)
Our choice of a binary value of Zi can be trivially relaxed. In the cases in which
Zi takes on many values one could choose any two values in the support of Zi to get
upper and lower bounds. If our goal is to minimize the size of the set we would choose






Pr(Ji = h | Zi = z
h) + Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z
ℓ)
 
The importance of support conditions once again becomes apparent from this ex-
pression. If we could ﬁnd values zℓ and zhsuch that
Pr(Ji =h | Zi = z
h) = 0
Pr(Ji =f | Zi = z
ℓ) = 0
then this expression is zero and we obtain point identiﬁcation of the ATE. When
Pr(Ji = h | Zi = z) or Pr(Ji = f | Zi = z) are bounded from below we are only
54able to obtain set estimates. A nice aspect of this is that it represents a nice middle
point between identifying LATE versus claiming the ATE is not identiﬁed. If the
identiﬁcation at inﬁnity eﬀect is not exactly true, but approximately true so that one
can ﬁnd values of zℓ and zh so that Pr(Ji = h | Zi = zh) and Pr(Ji = f | Zi = zℓ) are
small, then the bounds will be tight. If one cannot ﬁnd such values, the bounds will
be far apart.
In many cases these bounds may be wide. Wide bounds can be viewed in two ways.
One interpretation is that the bounding procedure is not particularly helpful in learning
about the true ATE. However, a diﬀerent interpretation is that it shows that the data,
without additional assumptions, is not particularly helpful for learning about the ATE.
Below we discuss additional assumptions for tightening the bounds on the ATE, such as
Monotone treatment response, Monotone treatment selection, Monotone instruments.
In order to keep matters simple, below we assume that there is no exclusion restriction.
However, if a exclusion restriction is known, this allows us to tighten the bounds.
Next we consider the assumption of Monotone Treatment Response introduced in
Manski (1997) which we write as
Assumption 5.4. Monotone Treatment Response
Yfi ≥ Yhi
with probability one.
In the ﬁshing/hunting example this is not a particularly natural assumption, but
for many applications in labor economics it is. Suppose we are interested in knowing
the returns to a college degree, and Yfi is income for individual i if a college graduate
whereas Yhi is income if a high school graduate. It is reasonable to believe that the
causal eﬀect of school or training cannot be negative. That is, one could reasonably
assume that receiving more education can’t causally lower your wage. Thus, Monotone
Treatment Response seems like a reasonable assumption in this case. This can lower
the bounds above quite a bit because now we know that
E(Yfi | Ji = h) ≥ E(Yhi | Ji = h) (5.29)
E(Yhi | Ji = f) ≤ E(Yfi | Ji = f). (5.30)
From this Manski (1997) shows that
0 ≤ ATE
55Another interesting assumption that can also help tighten the bounds is the Monotone
Treatment Selection assumption introduced in Manski and Pepper (2000). In our
framework this can be written as
Assumption 5.5. Monotone Treatment Selection: for j = f or h,
E(Yji | Ji = f) ≥ E(Yji | Ji = h)
Again this might not be completely natural for the ﬁshing/hunting example, but
may be plausible in many other cases. For example it seems like a reasonable as-
sumption in schooling if we believe that there is positive sorting into schooling. Put
diﬀerently, suppose the average college graduate is a more able person than the average
high school graduate and would earn higher income, even if she did not have the college
degree. If this is true, then the average diﬀerence in earnings between college and high
school graduates overstates the true causal eﬀect of college on earnings. This also helps
to further tighten the bounds as this implies that
ATE ≤ E(Yfi | Ji = f) − E(Yhi | Ji = h).
Note that by combining the MTR and MTS assumption, one can get the tighter bounds:
0 ≤ ATE ≤ E(Yfi | Ji = f) − E(Yhi | J = h).
Manski and Pepper (2000) also develop the idea of a monotone instrumental vari-
able. An instrumental variable is deﬁned as one for which for any two values of the
instrument za and zb,
E(Yji | Zi = za) = E(Yji | Zi = zb).
In words, the assumption is that the instrument does not directly aﬀect the outcome
variable Yji. It only aﬀects one’s choices. Using somewhat diﬀerent notation, but their
exact wording they deﬁne a monotone instrumental variable in the following way
Assumption 5.6. Let Z be an ordered set. Covariate Zi is a monotone instrumental
variable in the sense of mean-monotonicity if, for j ∈ {f,h},each value of x, and all
(zb,za) ∈ (Z × Z) such that zb ≥ za,
E(Yji | Xi = x,Zi = zb) ≥ E(Yji | Xi = x,Zi = za).
56This is a straight generalization of the instrumental variable assumption, but im-
poses much weaker requirements for an instrument. It does not require that the instru-
ment be uncorrelated with the outcome, but simply that the outcome monotonically
increase with the instrument. An example is that parental income has often been used
as an instrument for education. Richer parents are better able to aﬀord a college degree
for their child. However, it seems likely that the children of rich parents would have
had high earnings, even in the absence of a college degree.
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One can obtain tighter bounds by combining the Monotone Instrumental Variable as-
sumption with the Monotone Treatment Response assumption but we do not explicitly
present this result.
Blundell et al. (2007) estimate changes in the distribution of wages in the United
Kingdom using bounds to allow for the impact of non-random selection into work.
They ﬁrst document the growth in wage inequality among workers over the 1980s and
1990s. However, they point out that rates of non-participation in the labor force have
grown on the UK over the same time period. Nevertheless, they show that selection
eﬀects alone cannot explain the rise in inequality observed among workers: the worst
case bounds establish that inequality has increased. However, worst case bounds are
not suﬃciently informative to understand such questions as whether most of the rise in
wage inequality is due to increases in wage inequality within education groups versus
across education groups. Next, they add in additional assumptions to tighten the
bounds. First, they assume the probability of work is higher for those with higher
wages, which is essentially the Monotone Treatment Selection assumption shown in
Assumption 5.5. Second, they make the Monotone Instrumental Variables assumption
57shown in Assumption 5.6. They assume that higher values out of work beneﬁt income
are positively associated with wages. They show that both of these assumptions tighten
the bounds considerably. They ﬁnd that when these additional restrictions are made,
then they can show that both within group and between group inequality has increased.
5.7 Using Selection on Observables to Infer Selection on Un-
observables
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a) suggest another approach which is to use the amount
of selection on observable covariates as a guide to the potential amount of selection on
unobservables. To motivate this approach, consider an experiment in which treatment
status is randomly assigned. The key to random assignment is that it imposes that
treatment status be independent of the unobservables in the treatment model. Since
they are unobservable, one can never explicitly test whether the treatment was truly
random. However, if randomization was carried out correctly, treatment should also
be uncorrelated with observable covariates. This is testable and applying this test is
standard in experimental approaches.
Researchers use this same argument in non-experimental cases as well. If a re-
searcher wants to argue that his instrument or treatment is approximately randomly
assigned, then it should be uncorrelated with observable covariates as well. Even if
this is strictly not required for consistent estimates of instrumental variables, readers
may be skeptical of the assumption that the instrument is uncorrelated with the un-
observables if it is correlated with the observables. Researchers often test for this type
of relationship as well.17 The problem with this approach is that simply testing the
null of uncorrelatedness is not that useful. Just because you reject the null does not
mean it isn’t approximately true. We would not want to throw out an instrument with
a tiny bias just because we have a data set large enough to detect a small correlation
between it and an observable. Along the same lines, just because you fail to reject the
null does not mean it is true. If one has a small data set with little power one could fail
to reject the null even though the instrument is poor. To address these issues, Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005a) design a framework that allows them to describe how large
the treatment eﬀect would be if “selection on the unobservables is the same as selection
17Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a) discuss a number of studies that do so.
58on the observables.”
Their key variables are discrete, so they consider a latent variable model in which










i can be written as
Y
∗











= β0 + αDfi + X
′
iβ + νi.
Wij represent all covariates, both those that are observable to the econometrician and
those that are unobservable, the variable Sj is a dummy variable representing whether




the observable part of the index, and νi =
 K
j=1(1−Sj)Wijβj denotes the unobservable
part.
Within this framework, one can see that diﬀerent assumptions about what dictates
which observables are chosen (Sj) can be used to identify the model. Their speciﬁc
goal is to quantify what it means for “selection on the observables to be the same as
selection on the unobservables.” They argue that the most natural way to formalize
this idea is to assume that Sj is randomly assigned so that the unobservables and
observables are drawn from the same underlying distribution.
The next question is what this assumption implies on the data that can be useful
for identiﬁcation. They consider the projection:
proj(Zi | X
′
iβ,νi) = φ0 + φX
′
iβ + φενi
where Zi can be any random variable. They show that if Sj is randomly assigned,
φ ≈ φε.
This restriction is typically suﬃcient to insure identiﬁcation of α.18
18In some cases it is not point identiﬁcation, but either 2 or 3 diﬀerent points.
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assumptions and the truth is somewhere in between this assumption and the assump-
tion that Zi is uncorrelated with the unobservables which would correspond to φε = 0.
They assume that when φ > 0,
0 ≤ φε ≤ φ.
There are at least three arguments for why selection on unobservables would be ex-
pected to be less severe than selection on observables (as it is measured here). First,
some of the variation in the unobservable is likely just measurement in the dependent
variable. Second, data collectors likely collect the variables that are likely to be corre-
lated with many things. Third, there is often a time lapse between the time the baseline
data is collected (the observables) and when the outcome is realized. If unanticipated
events occur in between these two time periods, that would lead to the result.
Notice that if φ = 0 then assuming φε = φ is the same as assuming φε = 0. However,
if φ were very large the two estimates would be very diﬀerent which would shed doubt
on the assumption of random assignment. Since φ essentially picks up the relationship
between the instrument and the observable covariates, the bounds would be wide when
there is a lot of selection on observables and will be tight when there is little selection
on observables.
Altonji, Elder, and Taber consider the case of whether the decision to attend
Catholic high school aﬀects outcomes such as test scores and high school graduation
rates. Those who attend Catholic schools have higher graduation rates than those
who do not attend Catholic schools. However, those who attend Catholic may be very
diﬀerent than those who do not. They ﬁnd that (on the basis of observables) while
this is true in the population, it is not true when one conditions on the individuals
who attend Catholic school in eighth grade. To formalize this, they use their approach
and estimate the model under the two diﬀerent assumptions. In their application the
projection variable, Zi, is the latent variable determining whether an individual at-
tends Catholic school. First they estimate a simple probit of high school graduation
on Catholic high school attendance as well as many other covariates. This corresponds
to the φε = 0 case. They ﬁnd a marginal eﬀect of 0.08 meaning that Catholic school
raises high school graduation by eight percentage points. Next they estimate a bivari-
ate probit of Catholic high school attendance and high school graduation subject to the
60constraint that φε = φ. In this case they ﬁnd a Catholic high school eﬀect of 0.05. The
closeness of these two estimates strongly suggests that the Catholic high school eﬀect
is not simply a product omitted variable bias. The tightness of the two estimates arose
both because φ was small and because they use a wide array of powerful explanatory
variables.
6 Duration Models and Search Models
In this section we relate the previous discussion to the competing risks model and the
search model. We show that the competing risk model can be written in a way that
is almost identical to the Roy model. We also show how the basic ideas of exclusion
restrictions can be used to identify a version of a search model.
6.1 Competing Risks Model
With duration data a researcher observes the elapsed time until some event occurs.
The prototypical example in labor economics is the duration of unemployment and we
focus on that example. We explain why identiﬁcation of this model is almost identical
to identiﬁcation of the Roy model. Let Ti denote the length of an unemployment spell.
There are (at least) four diﬀerent ways to characterize the distribution of Ti. The ﬁrst
is the cumulative distribution function F(t) ≡ Pr(t > Ti), which in the context of
unemployment durations is the probability the individual found a job. The second is
the density function f. The third is the survivor function deﬁned as
S(t) ≡ Pr(Ti > t) = 1 − F(t).
The fourth is the hazard function, which is the job ﬁnding rate at time t, given that
the individual was unemployed at time t:
h(t) ≡ lim
δ→0




















There is a large literature on identiﬁcation of duration models. Heckman and Taber
(1994), Van den Berg (2001), and Abbring (2010) provide excellent surveys of this
literature.19 Rather than survey the full literature here we relate it to our previous
discussion. Given that Ti must be positive, it is natural to model Ti using the basic
framework we have been using all along:
log(Ti) = g(Xi) + εi.
Clearly if we could observe the distribution of log(Ti) conditional on Xi, identiﬁcation
of g and the distribution of εi would be straightforward.
However, often we cannot observe the full duration of Ti because the spell (or our
observation of it) is truncated before the worker is re-employed. For example, the
worker may die, be lost from the data, or the survey may end. In the classic medical
example we might want to estimate the duration until a patient has a heart attack, but
if she dies from cancer we never observe this event. Hence the name “competing risk
model.” To put this in the context of our Roy model example, suppose an unemployed
worker would take the ﬁrst oﬀer they received and they can get an oﬀer as a ﬁsherman
or a hunter. Deﬁne the model as
log(Tfi) = gf(Xi) + εfi (6.2)
log(Thi) = gh(Xi) + εhi (6.3)
where Tfi and Thi are the amount of time it would take until the worker received an oﬀer
as a ﬁsherman or as a hunter, Xi denotes observable variables that are independent
of the unobservables (εfi,εhi).20 The econometrician can observe whether the worker
19Key papers include Elbers and Ridder (1982), Heckman and Singer (1984a,b), Ridder (1990),
Honor´ e (1993), and Abbring and Ridder (2009).
20We do not need to make use of exclusion restrictions here so we do not distinguish between
observables that may enter diﬀerently.
62becomes a ﬁsherman or a hunter and the length of the unemployment spell. However,
notice that as Heckman and Honor´ e (1990) point out, this is just another version of
the Roy model. Rather than observe the maximum of Yfi and Yhi, the econometrician
observes the minimum of log(Tfi) and log(Thi).
The speciﬁcation (6.2) and (6.3) above is not the way that many researchers choose
to model duration data. Often they model the hazard function directly as it is some-
times easier to interpret. Moreover, if the observable covariates change over time, the
hazard model is a more reasonable way to model the durations. The most common
speciﬁcation is the mixed proportional hazard model
h(t | Xi = x) = ξ(t)φ(x)ωi (6.4)
where ξ(t) is referred to as the baseline hazard, ωi is an unobservable variable which is
independent of the observables, and Xi denotes observable characteristics. Most stud-
ies ﬁnd that the hazard rate for ﬁnding a job tends to decline with the unemployment
duration. The model above allows for two possible interpretations of this empirical reg-
ularity. First, it could be that as unemployment durations lengthen, skills depreciate,
making it harder to ﬁnd a job. This is captured by ξ(t). Second, it could be that some
people are just less able to ﬁnd a job than others in ways not captured by observables.
This is captured in ωi. Van den Berg (1999) provides a thorough discussion of this
model.
Heckman and Honor´ e (1989) show how to map the hazard speciﬁcation into a
framework that is similar to what we use in our analysis of the Roy model. The
transformation is simplest is when ξ(t) = 1. In that case one can write the survivor
function as
Pr(Ti > t | Xi = x,ωi = ω) = e
−tφ(x)ω. (6.5)
It is straightforward to derive equation (6.4) using the survivor function (6.5) and
equation (6.1). Deﬁne g( ) = −log(φ( )) and Fω to be the distribution of ωi. In
order to obtain the cumulative density function of unemployment durations we must
63integrate over the distribution of unemployed individuals:






1 − exp(−exp(log(t) − g(x) + log(ωi)))dFω
≡ F  ω(log(t) − g(x)) (6.6)
where F  ω is deﬁned implicitly by this relationship. Note that F  ω is a legitimate CDF,
as it is strictly increasing from 0 to 1.21 Thus one can think of the data generating
process as
log(Ti) = g(Xi) +   ωi
where   ωi is distributed according to F  ω and is independent of Xi.
In the more general case in which ξ(t) is not constant, it is well known that one
can write the survivor function as
e
−Ξ(t)φ(Xi)ωi (6.7)





Equation (6.7) diﬀers from equation (6.5) by the term Ξ(t) instead of t. Thus replacing
t with Ξ(t) in equation (6.6) yields
log(Ξ(Ti)) = g(Xi) +   ωi.
Heckman and Honor´ e (1989) use a more general framework to think about the
competing risks model in which the probability of not getting a ﬁshing job by time tf
and not getting a hunting job by time th, S(tf,th | Xi = x), can be written as
S(tf,th | Xi = x) = K(exp{−Ξf(tf)φf(x)},exp{−Ξh(th)φh(x)})
where φj(x) = exp(−gj(x)) for j = f,h. This is a generalization of a model in which
log(Ξf(Tfi)) = gf(Xi) +   ωfi
log(Ξh(Thi)) = gh(Xi) +   ωhi
21It is the distribution of a convolution between log(ωi) and an extreme value.
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S(tf,th | Xi = x) = Pr[log(Ξf(Tfi)) > log(Ξf(tf)),log(Ξh(Thi)) > log(Ξh(th)) | Xi = x]
= Pr[gf(x) +   ωfi > log(Ξf(tf)),gh(x) +   ωhi > log(Ξh(th))]
= Pr[−  ωfi < −log(Ξf(tf)) + gf(x),−  ωhi < −log(Ξh(th)) + gh(x)]
= F−  ωfi−  ωhi(−log(Ξf(tf)) + gf(x),−log(Ξh(th)) + gh(x))
≡ K(exp{−Ξf(tf)φf(x)},exp{−Ξh(th)φh(x)}) (6.8)
where F−  ωfi−  ωhi is the joint CDF of (−  ω∗
fi,−  ω∗
hi), and K is deﬁned implicitly as
K(a,b) = F−  ωfi−  ωhi(−log(−log(a)),−log(−log(b))).
Heckman and Honor´ e (1989), Theorem 1 contains the following result. We repro-
duce their result, only altering the notation.
Theorem 6.1. Assume that (Tfi,Thi) has the joint survivor function as given in (6.8).
Then Ξf,Ξh,φf,φh, and K are identiﬁed from the identiﬁed minimum of (Tfi,Thi)
under the following assumptions
1. K is continuously diﬀerentiable with partial derivatives K1 and K2 for i = 1,2
the limit as n → ∞ of Ki(η1n,η2n) is ﬁnite for all sequences of η1n,η2n for which
η1n → 1 and η2n → 1 for n → ∞. We also assume that K is strictly increasing
in each of its arguments in all of [0,1] × [0,1].
2. Ξf(1) = 1,Ξh(1) = 1,φf(x0) = 1 and φh(x0) = 1 for some ﬁxed point x0 in the
support X.
3. The support of {φf(x),φh(x)} is (0,∞) × (0,∞).
4. Ξf and Ξh are nonnegative, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing functions, except
that we allow them to be ∞ for ﬁnite t.
(Proof in Heckman and Honor´ e, 1989 )
Since the model is almost identical to the Roy model, the intuition for identiﬁcation
is very similar so we don’t review it here. We do mention a few things about these
assumptions. First note that assumption (2) in Theorem 6.1 is just a normalization
as one cannot separate the scales of φf,Ξf, and νf. The more notable diﬀerence
between this and the theorem we presented in the Roy model section above is the lack
65of exclusion restrictions. What is crucial in being able to do this is the assumptions









One could in principle use this form of identiﬁcation for the Roy model, but it is
somewhat less natural in the Roy framework as taking the limit as t → 0 corresponds
to taking limits as the log of wages become arbitrarily large. It also makes heavy use of
the independence assumption which is not necessary for identiﬁcation of gf when one
has exclusion restrictions. Finally, the basic approach will not expand to the “labor
supply” model in which we only observe wages in one sector and to the generalized
Roy model in the same way that exclusion restrictions do.
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) extends Heckman and Honor´ e’s (1989) results
on the mixed proportional hazards competing risk models in a few ways including
generalizing the assumptions for identiﬁcation somewhat and considering identiﬁcation
in the case in which researchers observe multiple spells.
6.2 Search Models
Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) present a nice survey of Empirical Search models.
We avoid a general discussion, but rather combine the proportional hazard model with
a search model. In a well known result Flinn and Heckman (1982) show that the search
model is not fully identiﬁed. They use the Lippman and McCall (1976) search model
in which workers search for jobs until their wage exceeds their reservation wage. In this
model, one essentially assumes that the worker stays at the job forever. All workers
are assumed to be ex-ante identical and face the same distribution of oﬀered wages
which we denote by F. The reservation wage wr is the point at which the individual










where c is search cost, r is the interest rate, and λ is the hazard rate of ﬁnding a job.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) assume that one observes the time until ﬁnding a job
(Ti) and the wage a worker receives conditional on ﬁnding the job. The only source of
66heterogeneity in the model comes from the timing of the job oﬀers and the draw from
the wage oﬀer distribution. Clearly one can identify the distribution of accepted wage
oﬀers which is the distribution of observed wages. The reservation wage is the lowest




for x ≥ w
r.
They can also identify the hazard rates of job ﬁnding which is
λ(1 − F(w
r)).
However, this is all that can be identiﬁed. In particular, one cannot separate λ from
(1 − F(wr)). Furthermore, the distribution of wage oﬀers below the reservation wage
is not identiﬁed. This is quite intuitive. Since nobody works at a salary below the
reservation wage, we do not have any information from the data on what that distri-
bution might look like.22 Furthermore, identiﬁcation of the model above relies on the
strong assumption that people are identical. All dispersion in observed wages comes
from identical people with identical skills being oﬀered diﬀerent wages. It also implies
a constant hazard rate of ﬁnding jobs λ, which is at odds with the data.
By using exclusion restrictions and using some of the ideas from the Roy model with
the arguments from the mixed proportional hazard model, most of the components of
the model can be identiﬁed. In particular let the arrival rate of job oﬀers be
λi = φ(Xλi,X0i)ωi (6.9)
where now Xλi is an exclusion restriction that inﬂuences the arrival rate, but not any
other aspect of the model. We assume that search cost is deﬁned as
log(Ci) = gh(Xhi,X0i) + εhi. (6.10)
Finally we assume the wage oﬀer that individual i would receive at time t is
log(Wfit) = gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfit. (6.11)
22Of course this raises an interesting question. What does it mean for a ﬁrm to make an oﬀer that
it knows no worker would ever take? In most wage posting models, a ﬁrm would never post a wage
that no worker would take (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). However, if there is a job match
component, one can also write down a model in which one could deﬁne the counterfactual wage at
which a worker would be paid at a job in which he would never take (whether that oﬀer is actually
“extended” or not is largely a semantic issue).
67The complicated aspect of this model is that workers may reject the ﬁrst oﬀer they
receive, and then receive a second diﬀerent oﬀer. Thus we need the time subscript
on εfit to denote that this draw can be diﬀerent. The second issue is that one would
expect the distribution of oﬀered εfit to not be identical across workers. We assume
that the distribution of εfit is individual speciﬁc coming from distribution Fiεf. That
is each time a worker gets a new oﬀer it is a draw from the distribution of Fiεf. As
above Xi is observable and independent of (νi,εfit,εhi).
Using the Lippman and McCall (1976) model, deﬁne W ∗




















If search costs are suﬃciently high, W ∗
i could be negative. But because the distribution
of wages is bounded below at 0, the reservation wage would be 0.
The added assumptions to identify the model are completely analogous to those we
used for the Roy model earlier
Assumption 6.1. (εfit,εhi,νi) is continuously distributed with support R3, and is in-
dependent of Xi.
Assumption 6.2. supp(φ(Xλi,X0i),gf(Xfi,x0),gh(Xhi,x0)) = R+ × R2 for all x0 ∈
supp(X0i).
Assumption 6.3. The marginal distributions of εfit,εhi, and νi have expected values
equal to zero. Moreover, the expected value of eεfit is ﬁnite.



















is distributed discretely (all support points have positive mass).





























68Theorem 6.2. Under assumptions 6.1- 6.5 and that φ and the distribution of ωi satisfy
the assumptions in Heckman and Honor´ e (1989), given that we observe Ti and wfiTi
from the model determined by equations (6.9)-(6.13), we can identify φ and gf on their
support, and gh up to location on a set X ∗ that has measure 1.
(Proof in Appendix)
Unlike some of the other models, we have not completely identiﬁed the error structure
(or the location of gh). This is probably not surprising given the complexity of Fiεf
and the relatively modest data conditions.23
We conclude this section after making three comments. First, it is not clear that
one cares about the location of gh.
That is, for many interesting policy counterfactuals, identiﬁcation of the aspects
above should be suﬃcient. Second, with more structure, more features of the model
should be identiﬁed.24 Third, if a researcher observes multiple spells on the same
worker, this can add much identifying information. The identiﬁcation problem arises
because if we see one worker making more than another we do not know if it is because
the ﬁrst worker is more productive or if they just happened to get a fortunate draw
from oﬀer distribution. With panel data, if we see that the ﬁrst worker consistently
earns more money across many employers, this would suggest that the diﬀerence has
more to do with ability than with draws from the oﬀer distribution.
We have barely scratched the surface of identiﬁcation of search models. Many
papers being estimated today are based on equilibrium models such as Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
We think there is much work to be done on identiﬁcation in these models.25
23Some aspects of the distribution of wages can be identiﬁed. For example identiﬁcation of the
marginal distribution of ωi is straightforward. Describing the distribution of Fiεf is diﬃcult because
it is a distribution of distributions. Given the cost in setting up notation to discuss this, we do not try
to characterize this distribution. A typical assumption would be that we could write εfit = ǫfi + ζfit
where ǫfi is an individual speciﬁc term that does not vary across wages and ζfit is i.i.d.
24Proving identiﬁcation in nonlinear models such as this one is often quite diﬃcult. This might
not be problematic in practice as researchers can search for multiple solutions in the data. If there
are multiple solutions, all can be reported. If only one solution exists, this should give a consistent
estimate of the truth.
25Canals-Cerda (2010) provides a recent example which adds measurement error in wages to the
Flinn and Heckman (1982) framework. Barlevy (2008) shows how to non-parametrically identify the
wage oﬀer distribution in the presence of measurement error in wages and unobserved heterogeneity
in skills.
697 Forward Looking Dynamic Models
In this section we discuss an extension of the generalized Roy model into a dynamic
framework with uncertainty and forward looking behavior. We show that the basic
identiﬁcation ideas presented above can be generalized to dynamic models. The iden-
tiﬁcation results for the simple models on which we focus can be extended to more
complicated environments. We begin with a two period model which in which there
are three choices made over two periods. We then discuss some general issues with
identifying the components of the Bellman Equation. Finally we present a dynamic
Generalized Roy model that one can use for dynamic treatment eﬀect evaluation. Once
again, we do not provide a full review of the literature, but focus on expanding the
generalized Roy model into a forward looking dynamic model. Abbring (2010) includes
a more complete discussion.26
7.1 Two period Discrete Choice Dynamic Model
We begin with the framework of Taber (2000) who considers a simple version of a
dynamic model. To think of this model as an extension of the basic Roy model we
go from two occupational choices to three. While we could modify the ﬁshing/hunting
example to a dynamic context, it is easiest to think about this in terms of an education
model as Taber does. In particular, a student ﬁrst decides whether to graduate from
high school or not. After graduating from high school, she decides whether to attend
college or enter the labor market directly. Extending beyond 3 choices is straightfor-
ward, but as in Taber we stick to the 3 choice model for expositional purposes. We
focus on identiﬁcation of the choice model and ignore data on earnings until section
7.3.
First consider the case in which there was no uncertainty or dynamics. We specify
the model using the three value functions
Vci = gc(Xci,X0i) + εci
Vdi = gd(Xdi,X0i) + εdi
Vhi = 0
26Recent papers that cover aspects of identiﬁcation not discussed here include Kasahara and Shi-
motsu (2009) and Hu and Shum (2009).
70where Vci is the value function for a college student, Vhi the value function for an
individual with exactly a high school degree, and Vdi the value function for high school
dropout. Individuals choose the option with the highest value function. That is
Ji = argmax {Vdi,Vhi,Vci}.
If there were no uncertainty in this model it would be a simple polychotomous choice
model. Matzkin (1993) considers identiﬁcation a general class of polychotomous choice
modes under a number of diﬀerent assumptions. One result is that since choices are
only identiﬁed up to monotonic transformations, Vhi = 0 is a location normalization
that we impose at this point. Adding dynamics and uncertainty does not change this
result.
Our goal now is to add dynamics and uncertainty to the model. The timing can be







Enter Labor Force (h)
College (c)
In the ﬁrst period the agent chooses whether to graduate from high school. If she
graduates in the ﬁrst period, she then chooses whether to go to college in the second.
The key aspect of the model is that information will be revealed between the ﬁrst and
second period. The agent’s preferences are summarized by lifetime reward function
Vji at each terminal state j ∈ {c,h,d}. Taber deﬁnes Vdi so that it is known at the
time the high school graduation choice is made. Then in period two, Vci and Vhi are
known when the choice between c and h is made. That is, in period one the agent
does not know Xci or εci. The ﬁrst period information is assumed to be contained in
(X0i,X1i,ε1i) where X1i is observable in period one and will be informative about Xci
while ε1i is unobservable and informative about εci. We assume that decisions are made
in order to maximize expected lifetime reward. Thus the reward function at node g in
71the ﬁrst period takes the value
Vg(x1,xd,x0,ǫ1) ≡ E[max{Vci,Vhi} | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0),ε1i = ǫ1].
The agent chooses node d if Vdi > Vg(X1i,Xdi,X0i,ε1i) and chooses node g otherwise.
If she chooses g in the ﬁrst period she chooses node c in the second if Vci > Vhi and
node h otherwise.
We let G(Xci | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0)) denote the distribution of Xci condi-
tional on (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0). We can summarize the information structure as
follows
Known to the Agent Learned by the Agent Observed by
at time one at time two the Econometrician
ε1i,εdi εci X0i,X1i,Xdi
X0i,X1i,Xdi Xci Xci
G(Xci | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0)) Ji
We ﬁrst consider identiﬁcation of gc and gd up to monotonic transformations. We
follow Taber (2000) closely except that we use our notation and use stronger assump-
tions than he does to avoid adding more notation.27
Assumption 7.1. For any (xc,x0) ∈supp{Xci,X0i} ,
supp{εdi} = R = supp{gd(Xdi,x0) | (Xci,X0i) = (xc,x0)}
supp{εci} = R
This assumption is analogous to what we have been assuming all along. In order
to estimate the full model, we need full support of gd conditional on (Xci,X0i).
Assumption 7.2. For any (xd,x0) ∈supp{Xdi,X0i},y ∈ R, and a ∈ (0,1), there
exists a set X1(xf,x0,y,a) with positive measure such that for x1 ∈ X1(xf,x0,y,a),
(a) Pr(gc(Xci,x0) < y | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0)) > a
27Taber (2000) allows for the possibility that the support of the error term could be bounded which
allows for weaker support condition on the observables.
72(b) The distribution of gc(Xci,x0) conditional on (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0) is
stochastically dominated by the unconditional distribution of gc(Xci,x0).
This is a stochastic analogue of a support condition. In the case in which Xci
were known at time one so that X1i = Xci, this would be implied be a standard
support condition. However, is general enough to allow for the distribution of Xci to
not be known at time one, but we still need a time one variable X1i that is useful in
forecasting Xci. For example Xci could be a variable like family income while the child
is in college while X1i is a variable like family income while the child is in high school.
This assumption states that we can condition on the value of this variable so that
the conditional probability that the agent chooses option c in the second period can
become arbitrarily small. In the family income example this means we could condition
on families whose income while the child is in high school are suﬃciently low that
college seems like a very unlikely outcome for the child.
Assumption 7.3. (ε1i,εdi,εci) is independent of (X1i,Xdi,Xci,X0i), for any ǫ1 ∈
supp(ε1i),
E(|εci| | ε1i = ǫ1) < ∞
and for any (x1,xd,x0) ∈ supp(X1i,Xdi,X0i),
E (|gc (Xci,x0)| | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0)) < ∞
Assumption 7.3 is the separable independent assumption that we have been making
throughout this chapter. We also need to assume that the stochastic components have
ﬁnite expectations so that Vg is ﬁnite.
Theorem 7.1. Under assumption 7.1,7.2, and 7.3, from data on (X1i,Xdi,Xci,X0i,Ji)
gd and gc are identiﬁed up to monotonic transformation.
(Proof in Taber, 2000)
The basic strategy used in this proof is a stochastic extension of “identiﬁcation
at inﬁnity.” This should not be surprising as this looks very much like the type of
selection problem we have discussed throughout this chapter: we can not observe the
choice between c and h unless individuals have already rejected d.
73We identify gc in almost exactly the same was as we identiﬁed gf as presented for
the Roy Model. With an exclusion restriction we can condition on gd arbitrarily low
so that the probability of selecting node d is close to zero. This leaves us with a simple
binary choice model in which the agents choose between h and c. The type of exclusion
restriction used here is a variable that enters gd, but does not inﬂuence gc directly. One
can see this in the following expression
lim
gd(xd,x0)→−∞
Pr(Ji = c | Xi = x)
= lim
gd(xd,x0)→−∞
Pr[gd(xd,x0) + εdi ≤ Vg(x1,xd,x0,ε1i),gc(xc,x0) + εci > 0]
= Pr[gc(xc,x0) + εci > 0].
Using standard identiﬁcation strategies for the binary choice model described in the
ﬁrst step of identiﬁcation of the Roy model, gc is identiﬁed.
Identiﬁcation of gd is somewhat trickier but one can use essentially the same idea.
In a static model one could use an identiﬁcation at inﬁnity argument by eliminating
c as an option and could compare the binary choice of d versus h. In this stochastic
case this is can not be done because the value of Xci is not known at time 1. Thus we
need a somewhat diﬀerent type of exclusion restriction, a variable known at time one
that does not enter gd directly, but does have predictive power for the distribution of
gc above and beyond Xdi. To see how this works, suppose we have a variable X1i that
satisﬁes these conditions and that as x1 gets small the conditional distribution of gc
shifts to the left. In this case
lim
x1→−∞




Pr(Ji = d | Xi = x)
= lim
x1→−∞
Pr[gd(xd,x0) + εdi > E [max(Vci,0) | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0),ε1i = ǫ1]]
=Pr[gd(xd,x0) + εdi > 0].
From this piece we can identify gd up to a monotonic transformation. This type of
variable will satisfy assumption 7.2. Note that the type of exclusion restriction we
74need here is something that is known at time 1, is useful in forecasting Xci, but does
not aﬀect Vdi.
Taber (2000) goes on to consider identiﬁcation of the distribution of the error terms.
The most general version of the full model above can not be identiﬁed without further
assumptions so he instead studies a few interesting cases. Identiﬁcation of the error
terms requires a diﬀerent kind of exclusion restriction. His key assumption requires
variation in gc(xc) holding x1 ﬁxed. Thus we need some uncertainty from the point of
view of the agents. The full model is not identiﬁed if agent’s have perfect information
about future values of Xci. A natural way to satisfy this exclusion restriction is with
time varying observables. The details can be found in Taber (2000).
7.2 Identiﬁcation of the Components of the Bellman Equation
While the model above is dynamic, we have not used Bellman’s equation. A natural
way to parameterize the model would be to deﬁne period speciﬁc utility functions
uh (Xhi,X0i,εhi),uc(Xci,X0i,εci), and ug(X1i,X0i,ε1i) in each of the three nodes above
other than the dropout node. If we think of the model as a two period model we can
deﬁne ud(t,Xdi,X0i,εdi) to be the period speciﬁc utility of individual i if she drops out
at time t. Conditional on graduating, she enters college if
uc (Xci,X0i,εci) > uh (Xhi,X0i,εhi).
The Bellman equation for the high school graduate is
Vg(x1,xd,x0,ǫ1) ≡ ug(x1,x0,ǫ1)
+ βE[max{uc(Xci,X0i,εci),uh(Xhi,X0i,εhi)} | (X1i,Xdi,X0i) = (x1,xd,x0),ε1i = ǫ1]
Mapping back to the notation in the subsection above, the rest of the value functions
are deﬁned as
Vdi =ud(1,Xdi,X0i,εdi) + βud(2,Xdi,X0i,εdi)
Vhi =ug(X1i,X0i,ε1i) + βuh(Xhi,X0i,εhi)
Vci =ug(X1i,X0i,ε1i) + βuc(Xci,X0i,εci).
An obvious question arises as to whether one can separately identify the components
of the value functions β,uh,uc, and ud. Unfortunately, in general one can not do this.
75Consider a full certainty version of the model. In this case the decision of which
occupation to enter would depend on Vdi,Vhi, and Vci only. One can choose any β > 0
and any ug, but then always ﬁnd a value of uc and uh to leave Vci and Vhi unchanged.
For a simple model such as the one Taber (2000) presents, parameterizing the model
in terms of the terminal value functions (i.e. Vdi,Vhi, and Vci) avoids this problem as
one does not need to decompose them into their components.
However, Taber’s parameterization is clearly not feasible for an inﬁnitely lived
model. Furthermore, it is not convenient in an ﬁnite time model with many periods
and state variables. It does not take advantage of the dimension reducing advantages
of the Bellman formulation: the functions would depend on the whole history of state
variables rather than just the current set.
Next we consider Rust’s (1994) model. Note that we use his notation exactly even
though it is inconsistent with our previous notation. Let Si represents the current state
and Di represents the discrete choice. In general Si will contain elements that are both
observed and unobserved by the econometrician. He writes the Bellman equation as












i | Si = s,Di = d)
where v is the value function, u is the period speciﬁc utility function, β is the discount
rate, D(s) is the choice set in state of the world s, and p is the transitional probability
distribution of the state variables. Rust (1994) shows that one can not separately
identify the model above from an alternative with the same β and p, but with





′ | Si = s,Di = d).
Intuitively this is close to the discussion above in the simple model in which you can
change the timing at which the innovation to utility takes place, without changing the
value function.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) discuss this issue in much greater detail. They not only
show that the model is not identiﬁed, but document the extent of underidentiﬁcation.
They additionally assume that one can write
u(Si,d) = ud(Xi) + εdi
where Xi is the observable part of the state space and the unobservable εdi is mean
independent of x and independent across periods (conditional on x and d). That is Si
76represents the state space, so if one knows Si, they also know Xi and εdi. They show


























i | Xi = x,Di = k)
where k is one of the elements of D(s). They further explore the model with additional
identifying information and correlated random eﬀects.
How problematic it is that the model is not fully identiﬁed? The answer to this
question depends on the purpose of the model. That is, even if the model is not fully
identiﬁed, one may still be able to identify policy counterfactuals of interest. Ichimura
and Taber (2002) provide one example of a case in which the policy counterfactual
can be identiﬁed. They start with the model of Keane and Wolpin (2001) and show
how one can estimate a semiparametric reduced form version of this model and use it
to evaluate the eﬀect of a tuition subsidy on college enrollment. They key is having
enough structure on the model to map variation in the data to the counterfactual
tuition subsidy.
Aguirregabiria (2010) presents a diﬀerent and somewhat more general example of
policy evaluation in a ﬁnite time dynamic discrete choice model. We do not get into
the details as it is diﬀerent from the types of labor models we study here, but he shows
that despite the fact that his full model is not identiﬁed, the welfare eﬀect function
resulting from the policy change can be identiﬁed. Thus one can do welfare analysis
even though the full model is not identiﬁed.
7.3 Dynamic Generalized Roy Model
Heckman and Navarro (2007) provide another example showing that one can identify
interesting counterfactuals even when the full model is not identiﬁed. Their study
complements the discussion in this chapter as it extends the work on identiﬁcation in
dynamic discrete choice models into the treatment eﬀects literature discussed in section
5 above. They consider a ﬁnite time optimal stopping problem. Using the notation
used above in section 7.2, Di is either zero or one, and once it is one it remains 1
forever. Their main example is a schooling model in which students decide at which
time to leave school (assuming that after leaving they cannot come back). The model
77is essentially a dynamic generalized Roy model. Let Tia and Lia respectively denote
the level of schooling and a dummy for whether individual i is out of school at age a.
Using a somewhat modiﬁed version of their notation we can write time a earnings as
Yi,a,t,ℓ =  (a,t,ℓ,Xi) + εi,a,t,ℓ
where t and ℓ represent potential outcomes of Ti,a and Li,a. Heckman and Navarro
(2007) also assume that the cost of schooling can be written as
Ci,t = Φ(t,Xi,Zi) + ωi,t.
In order to keep our notation complete and consistent across sections we will assume
that random variable Θi,a summarizes all information (both observables and unobserv-
ables) that individual i has at age a. This means that if we know Θi,a we also know
(Xi,Zi,Ti,a,Li,a,εi,a,t,l,ωi,t), so when we condition on Θi,a = θ, we are conditioning on
(Xi,Zi,Ti,a,Li,a,εi,a,t,l,ωi,t) = (x,z,t,ℓ,ǫa,t,ℓ,ωt). We will make use of this notation
below.
Once a student leaves school they make no further decisions, so if a student leaves
school at age a with t years of schooling, lifetime utility discounted to the time one
leaves school is written as
R(a,t,θ) = E






Yi,a+j,t,1 | Θi,a = θ
 
.
The only decision that agents make is whether they will drop out of school or not.
For a student at age a with t years of schooling the value function when they make
this decision is written as
V (a,t,θ) = max{R(a,t,θ),





E [V (a + 1,t + 1,Θi,a+1 | Θi,a = θ]}.
This is basically a dynamic version of the generalized Roy model. Identiﬁcation follows
by essentially combining the arguments used by Taber (2000) for the dynamic aspects
of the model with the arguments for identiﬁcation of the generalized Roy model. Heck-
man and Navarro (2007) use higher level assumptions to avoid the use of exclusion
78restrictions.28 They also use a factor structure on the distribution of the error term
to reduce dimension. We refer readers interested in these generalizations and in the
details of their proof to their paper. Here we attempt to give an intuitive feel for iden-
tiﬁcation of this model and show how it is related to identiﬁcation of the generalized
Roy model presented in section 3.3.
Identiﬁcation of reduced form choice model
In this case they do not derive an explicit reduced form, but note that
Pr(Ti,a = t | Xi = x,Zi = z)
can be identiﬁed directly from the data.
Identiﬁcation of the Earnings Equation  
With exclusion restrictions this can be done in exactly the same way as in the static
model. Assuming that εi,a,t,ℓ has a zero mean,
lim
Pr(Ti,a=t|(Xi,Zi)=(x,z))→1
E [Yi,a+j,t,1 | (Xi,Zi) = (x,z)] =  (a + j,t,1,x).
lim
Pr(Ti,a>t|(Xi,Zi)=(x,z))→1
E [Yi,a,a,0 | (Xi,Zi) = (x,z)] =  (a,a,0,x).
Thus this is a version of an “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity argument.” Heckman and Navarro
(2007) do not use this explicit argument because they avoid exclusion restrictions with
a higher order assumption. However, they do use identiﬁcation at inﬁnite.
Identiﬁcation of Φ
Next consider the identiﬁcation of the cost of schooling function Φ. The best way
to think about identiﬁcation in these types of models is to start with the ﬁnal period
and work backward.
Since the maximum length of schooling is ¯ T, the ﬁnal decision is made when the
individual has ¯ T − 1 years of schooling. At that point the student decides whether to
attend the ﬁnal year of school or not. Heckman and Navarro (2007) use an “identiﬁ-
cation at inﬁnity” argument so that Pr(Ti > ¯ T − 2 | Xi = x,Zi = z) ≈ 1. Then the
28This relates back to our discussion of identiﬁcation and exclusion restrictions in the sample
selection model at the very end of section 3. Exclusion restrictions prevent one from setting
  gf(x) = gf(x) + h(g(x)) but shape restrictions on g and gf can do this as well. Their “higher
level assumptions” are essentially assuming that we make restrictions on gf so that we can not add
h(g(x)) to it and remain in the permissible class of gf functions.
79problem becomes analogous to a static problem.29 That is
lim
Pr(Ti> ¯ T−2|Xi=x,Zi=z)→1
Pr(Ti¯ T = ¯ T | Xi = x,Zi = z)
= Pr
 
R(¯ T − 1, ¯ T − 1,Θi, ¯ T−1) <  (¯ T − 1, ¯ T − 1,0,x) + εi, ¯ T−1, ¯ T−1,0







R(¯ T, ¯ T,Θi ¯ T) | Θi, ¯ T−1
 
| Xi = x,Zi = z
 
.
This is analogous to identiﬁcation of the gh function in the Roy model.30
Now one can just iterate backward given knowledge of all variables at ¯ T and ¯ T −1.







V (¯ T − 1, ¯ T − 1,Θi, ¯ T−1 | Θ ¯ i,T−2
 
has been identiﬁed
so once again we can use the identiﬁcation approach of the static problem and can use
the same basic style of proof. That is we can condition on a set of variables so that
Pr(t > ¯ T − 2 | Xi = x,Zi = z) ≈ 1 so that identiﬁcation is analogous to the static
problem. Consider the decision with ¯ T − 2 years of schooling.
lim
Pr(Ti> ¯ T−3|Xi=x,Zi=z)→1
Pr(Ti,¯ T−1 = ¯ T − 1 | Xi = x,Zi = z)
= Pr
 
R(¯ T − 2, ¯ T − 2,Θi, ¯ T−2) <  (¯ T − 2, ¯ T − 2,0,x) + εi, ¯ T−2, ¯ T−2,0 − Φ(¯ T − 2,x,z)







V (¯ T − 1, ¯ T − 1,Θi ¯ ,T−1 | Θi ¯ ,T−2
 
| Xi = x,Zi = z
 
.
One can keep iterating on this procedure so that Φ is identiﬁed in all periods.
Identiﬁcation of the Distribution of the Error Terms







where τi is a vector random variable, the ε′s and ξ′s are all independently distributed,
and the α and λ terms are factor loadings. Given this structure and that the other
components of the model have been identiﬁed, identiﬁcation of the distribution of the
29Once again, Heckman and Navarro (2007) use higher order assumptions that do not require
exclusion restrictions. For example they allow for either an exclusion restriction or a cost variable to
identify the scale (such as tuition described in section 4 above).
30Note that we have violated one convention in this chapter which is to make conditioning explicit
such as E(  | Xi = x). When we condition on Θi, ¯ T−1 we cannot do this explicitly because while the
expectation inside the expression conditions on its outcome, the probability expression (immediately
after the = sign) treats Θi, ¯ T−1 as a random variable.
80error terms and factor loadings can be done by varying the indices in much the same
way as in the static model. We do not show this explicitly.
8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented identiﬁcation results for models of the labor market.
The main issue in all of these models is the issue of sample selection bias. We start
with the classic Roy model and devote much space to explaining how this model can be
identiﬁed. We then show how these results can be extended to more complicated cases,
the generalized Roy model, treatment eﬀect models, duration data, search models,
and forward looking dynamic models. We show the importance of both exclusion
restrictions and support conditions for all of these models.
Technical Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let X ∗ be the set of points (xc,xd) at which g is continuous in xc. For any (xc,xd) ∈ X ∗
and δ > 0, E
 
Yi |  Xc
i − xc  < δ,Xd
i = xd 
is identiﬁed directly from the data.





Yi |  X
c
i − x







so g(xc,xd) is identiﬁed on X ∗. By assumption 2.2, X ∗ has measure one.
Proof of Theorem 3.1






0) at which gh and gf are continuous in
xc.






0) ∈ X ∗,
lim
δ↓0
Pr(Ji = f |  X
c
i − x
c  < δ,X
d
i = x
d) ≡ Pr(Ji = f | Xi = x)
= g(x)
is identiﬁed.
81Thus we have thus established that we can write the model as Ji = f if and only if
g(Xi) > εi where εi is uniform [0,1] and that g is identiﬁed.
Next consider identiﬁcation of gf at the point (xf,x0). This is basically the standard
















































0,|1 − g(Xi)| < δ,Ji = f)
=gf(xf,x0).
Thus gf is identiﬁed. Note that having an exclusion restriction with strong sup-
port conditions is necessary to guarantee that the measure of the set of Xi satisfying
|1 − g(Xi)| < δ is not zero.
Next we show how to identify gh. Note that for any (xh,x0) where g is continuous
in the continuous covariates and δ > 0 we can identify the set
X(xh,x0,δ) ≡
 
  x ∈ X
















0,|0.5 − g(  x)| < δ
 
where ˜ x = (˜ xf, ˜ xh, ˜ x0). Under our assumptions it has positive measure.
The median zero assumption guarantees that
lim
δ↓0
X(xh,x0,δ) = {˜ x ∈ X
∗ : ˜ xh = xh, ˜ x0 = x0,0.5 = Pr(Ji = F | Xi = ˜ x)}
= {˜ x ∈ X
∗ : ˜ xh = xh, ˜ x0 = x0,0.5 = Pr(εhi − εfi ≤ gf(˜ xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0))}
= {˜ x ∈ X
∗ : ˜ xh = xh, ˜ x0 = x0,g(˜ xf,x0) = gh(xh,x0)}
is identiﬁed. Since g(˜ xf,x0) is identiﬁed, gh is identiﬁed.




Pr(Ji = f,log(Yfi) < s |  X
c
i − x






Pr(gh(Xhi,X0i) + εhi ≤ gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi,gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi ≤ s |  X
c
i − x




= Pr(εhi − εfi ≤ gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0),εfi ≤ s − gf(xf,x0))
82which is the cumulative distribution function of (εhi − εfi,εfi) evaluated at the point
(gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0),s − gf(xf,x0)). By varying the point of evaluation one can
identify the joint distribution of (εhi − εfi,εfi) from which one can derive the joint
distribution of (εfi,εhi).
Proof of Theorem 4.1
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= Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(z,x))
= ϕ(z,x).
Thus ϕ is identiﬁed on the relevant set. Next consider gf and the joint distribution of
(νi,εfi). Note that for all (z,xf,xh,x0) ∈ X ∗ and any y ∈ R, we can identify
lim
δ↓0
Pr(Ji = f,Yfi ≤ y |  X
c
i − x
c  < δ, Z
c
i − z














= Pr(νi ≤ ϕ(z,x),gf(xf,x0) + εfi ≤ y)
which is the joint distribution of (νi,gf(xf,x0)+εfi) evaluated at (ϕ(z,x),y). Holding
(xf,x0) constant and varying (ϕ(z,x),y) we can estimate this joint distribution. Since
the median of εfi is zero, gf is identiﬁed and given gf the joint distribution of (νi,εfi)
is identiﬁed. Since the model is symmetric in h and f, gh and the joint distribution of
(νi,εhi) are identiﬁed using the analogous argument.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The ﬁrst part is analogous to step three of identiﬁcation of the Roy model presented
in the text. Note that for any (z,x0) and δ we can identify the set
X(z,x0,δ) ≡
 
(˜ z, ˜ x) ∈ X
∗ :  ˜ z
c − z










0,|0.5 − ϕ(˜ z, ˜ x))| < δ
 
83and it has positive measure where the elements of (˜ z, ˜ x) are deﬁned in the obvious way.
The median zero assumption guarantees that
lim
δ↓0
X(z,x0,δ) = {(˜ z, ˜ x) ∈ X
∗ : ˜ z = z, ˜ x0 = x0,0.5 = Pr(Ji = F | (Zi,Xi) = (˜ z, ˜ x))}
= {(˜ z, ˜ x) ∈ X
∗ : ˜ z = z, ˜ x0 = x0,0.5 = Pr(εhi − εfi ≤ gf(˜ xf,x0) + ϕ(z,x0) − gh(˜ xh,x0)) − ϕ(z,x0)}
= {(˜ z, ˜ x) ∈ X
∗ : ˜ z = z, ˜ x0 = x0,ϕf(z,x0) − ϕh(z,x0) = gh(˜ xh,x0) − gf(˜ xf,x0)}
Since gh and gf are identiﬁed by Theorem 4.1, ϕf(z,x0) − ϕh(z,x0) is also iden-
tiﬁed. Given this we can identify the distribution of (εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi,εfi) and
(εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi,εhi) since in general
lim
δ↓0
Pr(Ji = f,Yfi ≤ y |  Z
c
i − z















Pr(Ji = r,Yhi ≤ y |  Z
c
i − z











= Pr(−(εhi + νhi − εfi − νfi) ≤ gh(xh,x0) + ϕh(z,x0) − gf(xf,x0) − ϕf(z,x0),εhi ≤ y − gh(xh,x0)).
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 4.1 shows that the marginal distributions of εfi and εhi are identiﬁed. Since
their expectations are ﬁnite, E(εfi) and E(εhi) are identiﬁed. We also showed that gf
and gh are identiﬁed over a set of measure 1. Note that E(πi) = E(Yfi) − E(Yhi) =
E(gf(Xfi,X0i) + εfi) − E(gh(Xhi,X0i) + εhi) = gf(Xfi,X0i) − gh(Xhi,X0i) + E(εfi) −
E(εhi). Because all the components of E(πi) are identiﬁed, E(πi) is identiﬁed as well.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
The marginal distribution of Xi, the joint distribution of (Xi,Yfi) conditional on Ji = f
and the joint distribution of (Xi,Yhi) conditional on Ji = h are identiﬁed directly from
the data. Assumption 5.2 guarantees that for both ﬁshing and hunting (j ∈ {f,h}),
84the conditional distribution of Yji conditional on Xi and Ji = j is the same as the
conditional distribution of Yji conditional on Xi alone. From each of these conditional
distributions and the marginal distribution of Xi, one can identify E(Yji) and thus the
average treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed by taking the diﬀerence between the two.
Proof of Theorem 6.2
Let X ∗ be the set of points (xc,xd) at which the functions are all continuous in xc.




i ) − gf(Xfi,X0i))].
Our ﬁrst goal is for any (xf,xλ,x0) ∈ X ∗, to identify the values of xh that send gh(xh,x0)
arbitrarily large so that all oﬀers are accepted. Since the reservation wage is strictly
decreasing in gh, the hazard rate is strictly increasing in gh, we can do this by ﬁx-
ing (Xfi,X0i) within some neighborhood of (xf,x0) and ﬁnding the value of xh that
minimizes the job ﬁnding rate.
More formally for any (xf,xλ,x0) and δ, deﬁne

























Note that this minimum will be such that as δ → 0, W r
i → 0 so that
lim
δ↓0

























= Gω∗,ε(t + log(φ(xλ,x0)),w − gf(xf,x0))
where G is the joint distribution between a convolution of ωit and an extreme value and
of εfit. Given G, applying the identiﬁcation arguments for the mixed proportional haz-
ard model one can identify φ. Furthermore, gf can be identiﬁed through the standard
argument for identiﬁcation of the regression model.
Finally, recovering gh can be done in an analogous was as for the Roy model. Notice
that the reservation wage is scalable so that if we increase both Ci and Wit by 10%,
then the reservation wage increases by 10% and the probability of job acceptance does
































but the probability of accepting a job and thus the expected duration remains the
same.
Thus as in the identiﬁcation of the slope that we discuss in Step 2 of identiﬁcation
of the Roy model, for any (xh,x0) and (˜ xh, ˜ x0) suppose we want to identify gh (xh,x0)−
gh (˜ xh, ˜ x0). Fix xλ and ˜ xλ so that φ(xλ,x0) = φ(˜ xλ, ˜ x0). Then the key here is ﬁnding
values xf and ˜ xf so that
lim
δ↓0
E(log(Z(Ti)) |  X
c
i − x





E(log(Z(Ti)) |  X
c
i − ˜ x
c  < δ,X
d
i = ˜ x
d)
But if this is the case it must be that
gf(xf,x0) − gh(xh,x0) = gf(˜ xf, ˜ x0) − gh(˜ xh, ˜ x0)
but then
gh(xh,x0) − gh(˜ xh, ˜ x0) = gf(xf,x0) − gf(˜ xf, ˜ x0)
where the right hand side has already been identiﬁed. Thus gh is identiﬁed up to
location on the set X ∗.
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